RAND Unveils "Cognitive COIN"

Sailors on the Nimitz before she sailed a week or so ago to relieve the Eisenhower in the Persian Gulf and join the Stennis carrier group.

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The team at RAND have come up with a document of hope, for those, like myself, waiting for something like this for a long time from those close to the government channels.

They have given the "war of ideas" a spiffy new name, "Cognitive COIN".

But, they have gone further. They've actually outlined organizational steps. The bad news is that this comes late in the game, without an appreciation about whether prior mis-steps are reversible or not. Also, it doesn't convey urgency in strong tones and topics like "training" rather than "crash training" make it frustrating, although such phrases are invariably bureaucratic-attractive.

I highly recommend reading at least the summary. Money quote:

The four cognitive abilities that are most important to COIN operations are anticipation, opportunism, decision speed, and learning in action, applied through rapid-adaptive decision making. In 21st-century COIN, tight control and bureaucracy must yield to the power of networked intelligence, with each operative authorized to act, react, and adapt. With these notions as a backdrop, this paper offers concrete ideas for gaining the cognitive advantage in anticipating and countering the new global insurgency.

Popular Press Now Covering Counterinsurgency History

From Slate, David Silbey writes a short history of the Phillipines insurgency under Theodore Roosevelt:

What does this tell us about today? Interestingly, many of the same issues that have dogged the current American campaign in Iraq dogged American efforts in the Philippines. These include the inability to recognize that the war was not over simply because we thought it should be over, the difficulty in adjusting to a new kind of war, the constant interaction of domestic politics and military affairs, and the divided command structure in the Philippines. And yet, the United States in the Philippines won not only the conventional war but the insurgency. Why?

A Deadly Revolving Door

One starts to see how Saddam's system of nesting groups to watch other groups (including "stiffners") may have gotten its impetus: weak policing within the ranks.

For at least the second time in the past 5 months, some of the most dangerous terrorists have been able to escape from an Iraqi jail guarded by Iraqi police. Today, militants stormed Mosul's northwestern Badoush prison and freed over 140 prisoners, most of whom are described as "insurgents." You can bet they weren't traffic violators; they were probably key operatives in terrorist cells who were painstakingly hunted down by the U.S. military and Iraqi army. The overwhelmed police asked the U.S. military for help, but too late to stop the escaping terrorists - Andrew Cochran, CT Blog

Quotus re Quotus

Counterinsurgency Quote for the Day:

In a head-on clash between violence and power, the outcome is hardly in doubt. If Gandhi's enormously powerful and successful strategy of nonviolent resistance had met with a different enemy--Stalin's Russia, Hitler's Germany, even prewar Japan, instead of England--the outcome would not have been decolonization, but massacre and submission. However, England in India and France in Algeria had good reasons for their restraint. Rule by sheer violence comes into play where power is being lost; it is precisely the shrinking power of the Russian government, internally and externally, that became manifest in its "solution" of the Czechoslovak problem--just as it was the shrinking power of European imperialism that became manifest in the alternative between decolonization and massacre. To substitute violence for power can bring victory, but the price is very high; for it is not only paid by the vanquished, it is also paid by the victor in terms of his own power. This is especially true when the victor happens to enjoy domestically the blessings of constitutional government.
(On Violence, Hannah-Arendt, 1969, p.53)

Critiquing COIN 'orthodoxy' and Blostering OEF

Over at Oxblog, Patrick Porter and Taylor Owen have put up interesting thought pieces, Patrick's on veteran military guy Ralph Peter's critiques of COIN (Killing Insurgencies) and Taylor's on keeping NATO's Afghan ops on track.

Tracking the Surge: Uneasy Silence at COP Charlie, Ghazaliyah

Time reporter Charles Crain writes about an eering silence in Ghazaliyah (see posts on Baghdad Conurbation for general info on Baghdad neighborhoods).

Meanwhile the militia and the insurgents have been finding ways to operate under the radar and out of firing range. On the streets of Ghazaliyah, Sgt. Michaud said, the Mahdi Army continued to "slowly, but surely," force Sunnis from their homes through other forms of intimidation. The more immediate threat, though, may be a spectacular Sunni insurgent attack designed to show residents in Ghazaliyah that their power has not been blunted. "If I'm the enemy: I've lost the initiative," Peterson said. "I've got to do something big and visual."

This suggests that the coordinated attack on the Tarmiya COP and the massive car bomb explotion earlier in the month were related to changing tactics, rather than outright indicators of new strength in the insurgency.

Sadly, however, dividing lines remain:

In Ghazaliyah, northeast of Baghdad's airport, Iraq's savage and complex civil war has been playing out in miniature. Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia has been encroaching from Shula, the Shi'a-dominated neighborhood to the north. The Sunni minority has virtually vanished from northern Gazaliyah, driven away by murder and intimidation. In the heavily-Sunni southern part of the neighborhood homegrown insurgents and foreign jihadists have been attacking the Americans and Shi'a-dominated security forces.

The COP is a short drive from the road that serves as a dividing line between Ghazaliyah's Sunni and Shi'a communities. Moved from its home at Camp Liberty, one of the bases within the sprawling American compound at the airport, Charlie Company fortified a row of houses with concrete, razor wire and plenty of firepower. The COP is the first test of the counter-insurgency strategy the military plans to implement across Baghdad.

Operation Kryptonite

Oh, I wish so much that we have photos of this!

Taliban, self-proclaimed "heros and martyrs of al-Islam", throwing children in front of bullets to save themselves ...

By Terry Friel
KABUL (Reuters) - Taliban fighters used children as human shields to flee heavy fighting this week during an operation by foreign and Afghan forces to clear rebels from around a key hydro-electric dam, NATO said on Wednesday.

The Taliban have used human shields before, but never children, local residents say.

Vicious Intimidation and Elimination of Journalists

The absolutely brutal campaign to de-capitate the eyes and ears of the world, to intimidate professionals into carrying messages sympathetic to 'jihad' or 'insurgency', and to disable intellectual challenge continues.

The journalist dimension of the violence puts in high relief just how much the battle is not military in nature, if anyone needs more evidence.

Meanwhile, how much do the MNF and the Iraqi government rely on the press to 'get the word out'? It's hard to build a communications network that competes with the Mosques ...

item:

MOSUL: Gunmen killed an Iraqi journalist outside his home in the northern city of Mosul, a local police officer said Saturday. Khudhir Yunis, a freelance journalist working for a number of Baghdad-based newspapers, was shot dead overnight in Mosul's southern Sumar neighbourhood, police Major Mohammed Ahmed said. Iraq was in 2006 described as the most dangerous place in the world for journalists, where more than 130 journalists and media workers have been killed since the US-led invasion in March 2003.

Yunis, a member of the Iraqi Journalist Association in Mosul, was the fifth journalist to be killed in the country's third largest city in two months.

The bloodiest attack on Iraq's media in recent months came when gunmen burst into the Baghdad offices of new television network Al-Shaabiya on October 12 [?2006] and killed at least nine staffers, including reporters and the general manager.

More detail from Committe to Protect Journalists.

Petreas, Counterinsurgency from the Ground Up

General Petreas offers up his lessons learned from soldiering on Iraq, by reference in testimony this week and in a Military Review article from this time last year:

A summary of points:

1. Don't do too much with your own hands.
   
   Citing T.E. Lawrence observation, "Better the Arabs do it tolerably, than you do it perfectly." Lesson lost in so many ways in the Bremer-Rumsfeld era.
   
2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half life
3. Money is ammunition
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is crtical to success
5. Analyze the cost-benefits before each operation [remove more bad guys than create]
6. Intelligence is the key to success
7. Everyone must do national building ["Civil Affairs" is not enough]
8. Help build institutions, not just units
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier
10. Success in counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations
11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders
    [This offers some simple, but profound observations about the primacy of individual courage and morality/fairness.]
12. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders
13. Especially during counterinsurgency operations, a leader's most important task is to set the right tone.
    [Some heavy words in this section ... ]

Last, citing a 1986 article by General Galvin:

an officer's effectiveness and chance for success, now and in the future, depend not only on his character, knowledge, and skills, but also, more than ever before, on his ability to understand the changing nature of conflict."

I worry that our fascination with Patreaus puts a target on his back, recalling that the head of the Scorpion Brigades got targeted and this from Ricks at the WaPo:

Perhaps most important, Army insiders say they expect Petraeus to show a very different style from his reserved predecessor, Gen. George W. Casey Jr. "You are going to see a much more active command style than Casey," said one officer who has worked with both men. "Petraeus will be out walking the streets, visiting units and firing up both his Iraqi and coalition forces with his personal attention."

50 years on from the Battle of Algiers, the "Battle of Baghdad"?

Charlie Rose put on his first program on counterinsurgency (that I know of) tonight, with Alastair Horne, author of the classic text on the French experience in Algeria, "A Savage Peace".

Alastair listed five similarities that he sees with the effort in Iraq:

1. US is fighting with a regular army
2. There are porous borders
3. Insurgents targeting local police, judges, administration
4. Torture
5. Difficulty to extricate [took DeGaulle 4 years]

My comments are as follows:

1. The army has changed, I believe, at the fighting level. They are ahead of the pundits on what needs to be done, in my estimation.
   
   What has not occurred is broad changes in incentives and commitment that is needed at the most senior levels, like longer tours of duty (especially for advisers), revamping of financial/career incentives in the officer corps, and true co-integration of effort (i.e. bring civilians outside the chain into the 'circle of classified secrecy'). I'm at a great distance from these issues, but that is how the field looks from afar.
   
   
2. There are hundreds of people in Iraq without jobs. Everyone has their own gun. Why not send them to do border security and kill two birds with one stone? They don't even have to do a great job, but many willing workers will at least have an income and a respectable position.
   
   The problem here, as viewed from afar, is that the US never saw itself in Iraq for a long period, and therefore did not take the long-term issues of border security upon itself.
   
   What's more, it is not clear how much of the border insecurity is a problem and how much is positioning related to whose fault the violence is attributed.
   
   Last, census and other methods are ways to forestall the impact of loose borders. There are smugglers that handle the borders, too. It's not clear that they cannot be co-opted or whether it has been tried.
   
   The Saudis are building fence to help close their border, physically. The Syrians, despite their bad press, have had a closed border with Iraq for a long, long time (at one point, they even allowed their border to be violated as the US chased, in hot pursuit, what turned out to be gas-smugglers). The Iranian borders in the South ... I don't know enough about.
   
   
3. This is very, very grave and few early on understood the importance of it (did Rumsfeld, et. al?). Even today, many seem to think it is just one issue among many, but it is not. Charlie Rose himself skips over it, even though his second guest, former Head of Research for the Iraqi National Museum, points out the consequences, softly and plainly.
   
   
4. This is a truly a problem, because the domestic politics of the war have been badly handled, in part. The conception of the war as the US bringing something, rather than enabling a chance for something, has permeated enough to have deleterious effects (or, as Noah Feldman wrote, the risks of old school patrician attitudes toward nation building).
   
   The original mission to "set the conditions for democracy to emerge" was open-ended and, as we can plainly see, a political, not primarily military endeavor. Both the politics and the military have had setbacks, even failure, and there is no domestic consensus about how to re-set, if at all.
   
   With luck, this consensus will emerge if enough people start to get behind a proper conceptualization of the Iraqi effort and start to manage the politics of it properly.
   
   The idea that only "success" will dispel the critics is more bad planning, as seductive as that may be. For what the Army is calling the "Long War", we have to transition from notions of "control", fantasies about the "glory" of America, and the promise of Victory, and settle in to a quiet, steadfast, abiding confidence in process.

Just to close, I'll add that the sectarian violence in Baghdad may not have the same motivations as an Algerian-style insurgency. Therefore, at least on that score, the "Battle for Baghdad" is quite unlike counterinsurgency, although it might be linked to it in important ways.

Rand Publishes Its Collective Wisdom on Counterinsurgency

Catching up on new pubs.

Austin Long at Rand pulls together a summary of all of RAND's work on insurgencies.

Areas of focus include government organization. Without surprise, more emphasis on co-integration of effort ("unity") and greatly expanded model of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Also reviewed are amnesty and reward programs, border security (external support).

Apparently, a lot this stuff is not intuitive ...

At the end, they mention census and national identity cards (something Saddam used extensively to maintain control).

I can recall, during the first months after the invasion, when the Ministries were being looted and during the days of General Garner, thinking that, with the loss of computerized registers of citizens, how elections were going to be held? Every time Rumsfeld mentioned old regime "dead-enders", I winced thinking that some early effort to quickly get a who's-who list might have provided invaluable information down the road ... anyway, there it is.

A page from Counterinsurgency History ...

These both just point out the need for some real metrics on progress, some systematic indicators of advance or retreat. Something still long overdue, while so many focused on "strategy" (or what that amounts to, in their mind), troop levels, and disagreements over threat-perception(s).


January 11th, 2006
Kentucky International Convention Center
Louisville, Kentucky

President Bush:

And so the [Iraqi'] army is getting on its feet. We've turned over a lot of territory to the army. And they're good fighters, they really are. I spent a great deal of time with General Abizaid and General Casey -- they were in Washington this past week -- these are generals, you'd be happy to hear, who tell me the way it is, not the way they think I would like it to be. I can't tell you how good the caliber of our military brass -- and those in the field, by the way, all the way up and down the line, are good, they are good people -- (applause) -- better trained, not just numbers, I'm talking about capacity to take the fight and stay in the fight. And as I've said, as the Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down. So the strategy, the security strategy is to let the Iraqis do the fighting. It's their country. The people have shown they want democracy. Millions voted. And now part of the mission is to give this government a security force which will help fight off the few who are trying to stop the hopes of the many.

One of the places where we've lagged is training police. There are three types of police. There's a national police force, kind of like a swat team, a national swat team, that can move -- they're pretty well trained. They need some human rights training. In other words, part of the problem in Iraq is you've got people that are plenty irritated at what took place in the past and they're going to use their positions of power to take revenge. You can't have a democracy in which the police don't enforce the rule of law, but enforce their view of revenge. And so you got ethics training, rule of law training -- all done by good troops who are embedded -- who are side-by-side with this Iraqi police force. And it's getting better, it really is.

January 19th, 2006
The Grand Hyatt New York
New York, New York

Vice-President Cheney:

Their efforts [Americans in uniforms] are bringing us closer to the goal we share with Iraq's leaders: a democratic country that can defend itself; a nation that will never again be a safe zone for terrorists; and a model for peaceful democratic reform in a troubled region [?]. When that goal is achieved, all of us will live in a safer world.

Our strategy in Iraq is clear, our tactics will remain flexible; we'll keep at the work until we finish the job. Progress has not come easily, but it has been steady.

All Sectarian Violence is NOT created equally ...

Counter-terrorism quote for the day:

The alternative formulation of why sectarian violence is fomented has much to do with stirring up old and ancient rivalries for the sake of creating a base of operations.

"Mixed" neighborhoods make it hard to consolidate power.

Such bases cannot be left to fester, if history is any guide. It is for this reason that counter-terror strategies must also deal with sectarian violence and not think of them solely as a matter that is unrelated *intrinsically* to overall objectives.

The General Guidelines for Al-Jemaah Islamiah Struggle - otherwise known as the PUPJI - outlines the three phases of jihad: iman (faith of individuals), hijrah (building a base of operations) and then jihad qital (fighting the enemies of Islam). Right now, JI is focusing on the iman and hijrah until it has the capability for jihad qital. To that end, it is employing a three-tined strategy: recruitment and proliferation of cells, engaging in sectarian conflict and engaging in social welfare.

Top wrote an 82-page tract based on the theoretical model espoused by Abu Musab al-Suri, al-Qa'ida's leading theorist, on how to establish loosely affiliated jihadi cells. With a secure base in MILF camps in Mindanao, JI can effectively regroup.

JI is also redoubling its "uhud project" of fomenting sectarian violence in Central Sulawesi and the Malukus in order to create a pure Islamic zone from which it can emanate. Since 2004, bombings, targeted assassinations, and raids on military-police facilities have become regular. Attacks, including the beheading of three schoolgirls, are meant to undermine confidence in the state and give members a sense of defending their religion. JI is out to undermine the Malino Accords and engage in Islamist vigilantism.

Finally, JI is adopting a Hamas-style model, focusing on social work and charity - what I refer to as the "inverse triangle" - to build up its popular support and forge greater links to Islamist parties and organisations. link

Can US Diplomacy follow Action-Reaction-Counteraction?

THE "PARIS BALLS" ARE SENT

Syria and Iran have already publicly started to maneuver diplomatically to counter any pressure campaign that may - may - come out of the Baker-Hamliton report recommending a new diplomatic initiative.

Both Syria and Iran will both likely use the opportunity to say that they do not support "occupation" and cleverly try to keep themselves from coming to open cross-swords with jihadis.

WILL THE US AND HER ALLIES SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO FIGHT THE JIHADI MESSAGE?

'Normal' public diplomacy on such statements probably requires any number of stock responses.

However, in a well-tuned, highly-oiled, top-notch "GWOT", the counter-message arm of the effort would kick into high gear to deal with such an afforded opportunity. Keep your own track of what, if any, counter-response there is ...

The 'jihadi' message of an 'occupation', in the style of how 'occupations' occurred during the time of the Prophet, should be brought to the forefront. Someone has to stand up and say, "It's one thing to fight an old-style occupation, as they existed in days of old; but it is quite another to fight off people who are doing everything to set-up a government of the people and for the people ..."

In short, SOMEONE at least has to try to engage in 'war-of-ideas', yes?

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT STILL FAR, FAR BEHIND WHAT IT NEEDS TO BE

Only a short time ago, Israel had taken a very difficult, strategic move to further isolate the Palestinian refusniks, by withdrawing both settlers and the IDF from Gaza. There was more pressure than in a long time on the Palestinian leadership to negotiate.

In the context of nuclear testing in North Korea, Iran was losing the struggle to get World opinion and regional opinion on its side for its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

What has happened since?

Well, Hizb'allah (HA) has kidnapped two soldiers, extra-judicially, in a cross-border activity without the knowledge or support of the Lebanese government.

In the ensuing struggle, HA has somehow worked their way out from under that stunning indictment and more, including an apology from Nasrallah that implies he was complicit.

The Iranian President has launched a public, high-profile campaign, including an open letter to the US to try to relieve some of the enormous pressure on the Palestinians.

TIRED OF WAITING

So far, these initiatives seem to be working - on public opinion. Can a world-community, interested in peace, cut through these 'reactions' to a well formed counteraction?

How many more years into the haplessly called "GWOT" do we have to wait for a coordinated, diplomatic posture that is ready, willing, and able to countermand these 'initiatives', a pattern which we've seen before?

How long do we have to wait to get a multi-national public diplomacy going that is coordinated among Western nation's Foreign Offices and that has some street-level impact?

The Fallacy of "Emboldening Terrorists"

We want the people of Iraq to live in a free society. It's in our interests. In my judgment, if we were to leave before the job is done, it would only embolden terrorists, it would only embolden the extremists. It would dash the hopes of millions of people who want to live in a free society, just like the 12 million people who voted in the Iraqi election. They want to live in a free society. And we support this government, because the government understands it was elected by the people. And Prime Minister Maliki is working hard to overcome the many obstacles in the way to a peaceful Iraq, and we want to help him. - President Bush, al-Malki visit, 2006 11 30

I would like to argue that this judgement about emboldening the terrorists is partly misdirected, as much as those who wanted so passionately to "send the terrorists a message" after 9/11.

We may not be able to "win" every battle with terrorists. It may be arrogance to suggest that we can. Terrorist methods are powerful.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WARFARE

Managing psychology of warfare is important, even key sometimes. However, one has to be careful in elevating it to a strategic goal, rather than a tactic. For sure, to fight the perverse messages of 'global jihad', it is important to at least stand up for those values indicted and greatly jeopardized by the false 'religious' callings of militant jihad.

But, to shape strategic choices because of how they might impact the psychology of terrorists is either to plainly put tactics ahead of strategy (usually a poor choice, a confusion) or to get the wrong balance among strategic imperatives.

SOME PRESSURE CAN ALSO BE STAGED, TIMED OR SCALED, NOT JUST CONTINUOUS, MONOTONE

We might do better to think in terms of putting degrees of pressure on jihadi groups, from any number of angles, and in terms of choices or tactics that allow for our freedom of action, action that is not drawn into a straightjacket because of perceived psychological impacts.

Besides, what could be better than duping an enemy into a false sense of security, than "emboldening" them?

What is important is that, whatever gains they might try to consolidate from a cessation or tactics retreat, stand in continuous jeopardy of being pushed over or pushed back. We ought not to think of 'losing face' over the kinds of smart, tactical shifts that would make a time-phased strategy in certain circumstances smart.

MORE ON THE EFFORT TO CONFRONT RADICAL, MILITANT 'JIHAD'

There is a question about whether to continuously engage in the political debate that militant jihad puts forward, as well as any number of other messages or to attack annointed leaders, lest one confer a kind of legitimacy and free press to their aims.

Ideas are still forming on precisely what the appropriate countermeasures are at each stage of militant jihad, as it is envisioned by its own theorists.

One way is to apply "medicine" (choice countermeasures) in various doses and then to measure how they are working. This is how governments in the Arab world effectively work now, quite arguably - they make statements and wait to see how 'the Street" responds. ('The Street' is nothing more than the long-term educational challenge, the literacy problem/dimension, in some respects.)

WRONG TO WITHDRAW, RIGHT TO REPOSITION

Accordingly, I think that abject calls for withdrawal ought to be met with derision, except as part of a broder plan to reposition the pressure campaign.

It might be possible to fashion a long-term strategy to confront radical Islam by denying it its next steps, by picking an choosing which issues on which to engage insofar as they have direct impact on achieving the next goals of the jihad (I'm thinking of the three phases mentioned below, iman, hijrah, and then jihad).

If one worries that the removal of military pressure in one situation might lead to greater recruitment, one has to re-position against recruitment, suggesting that the 'withdrawal' is a way to trap new recruits, who will be confronted/captured shortly.

In sum, there ought to be a continuous engagement, in my view, a pressure campaign, and it can include periods of repositioning in which certain confrontations are conceded as no longer productive and for which we do not have to worry about 'emboldening' some enemy today, if that is just a set-up for them to be neutralized or marginalized tomorrow.

Rummy Accepts Medal, Schedules Town Meeting, Farewell Set for 15th

Sec Def Donald Rumsfeld accepted the Union League's Gold Medal a week ago or so. According to Defenselink, Gates will assume responsibility on the 18th and Rummy's farewell party is the 15th.

One last chance to soak up Rummyspeak:

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(AP Photo/Haraz N. Ghanbari)

In a surprise move, Sec Def Rumsfeld takes a ... quasi-victory lap, visiting troops in Iraq on Dec. 9th ...

The Second "Thumpin'" - Comments on ISG Report

Presidential Historian, Michael Beschloss, in Newsweek:

History suggests that Baker-Hamilton’s ultimate contribution may be whatever outside pressure it generates on President Bush and Congress to achieve a bipartisan solution in Iraq.

The times in history when such panels have had the greatest impact have been when they provided a president with the mechanics and bipartisan blessing to do what he probably wanted to do anyway. The best two examples are both from the Reagan years. In 1981, President Reagan appointed an expert commission led by Alan Greenspan (not yet Fed chairman) to suggest how to fix that generation’s Social Security problems.

Six years later, besieged by the Iran-contra scandal, Reagan appointed a bipartisan group headed by Texas Republican Sen. John Tower to suggest how to revise White House management to exclude the future possibility of unauthorized covert operations. By promptly accepting the Tower Commission’s wise recommendations and admitting his mistakes, Reagan helped to save his presidency.

One reason the Tower findings were so briskly accepted was the expertise of the commission’s staff director, who knew how important it was for the president to take its report seriously. This was a young lawyer named Stephen Hadley, who has gone on to become President Bush’s national-security adviser.

George F. Will, in WaPo:

The Iraq Study Group, like the policy it was created to critique, was overtaken by the unexpectedly rapid crumbling of the U.S. position in Iraq since the ISG was formed in March.
...
Also in the week before the ISG's report, the leaked Donald Rumsfeld memo urged policy to "go minimalist." That is generally good advice to government, but much of the rest of the memo, with its 21 "illustrative new courses of action" -- a large number, and evidence that none is especially promising -- echoed the 1960s Great Society confidence in government-engineered behavior modification...

The ISG's central conclusion, important to say with the group's imprimatur even though the conclusion is obvious, is that the problem with Iraq is the Iraqis, a semi-nation of peoples who are very difficult to help.

Syria weighs in, again, on Iraq

Vice President weighs in here, with Syrian perspective and demands that include a fixed timetable under the 'excuse' of fighting 'occupiers'.

In reference to a Syrian worry about a widening conflagration coming out of a deteriorating Iraq, he either directly calls the Baker-Hamilton bluff or opens public negotiations by mitigating it:

As for the notion of an international conference on Iraq, many European countries have recommended it to us. We support the formula but only if we know what the intended outcome of such a conference is. It has to have reasonable objectives that we can agree to work for.

We will not support just any political process in Iraq, we will support it only when it takes into account the interests of all the different groups in Iraq, when the Unity of the country is preserved, and when there is a time table for withdrawal (of US troops)

The US has failed terribly in Iraq. The Baker-Hamilton Report is an indication that the American people are waking up to the fact that they have been badly deceived by their government in Iraq. Some say that through dialogue with Syria and Iran, Iraq can be stabilized. We are not so arrogant as to believe that Syria can single-handedly solve the Iraq problem, which will have repercussions throughout the world. Perhaps not even all countries working together can help solve Iraq's problem, but it is incumbent on us to have the modesty to listen to each other and to try what we can.

We will not help any Iraqi leader who isn't against the occupation of Iraq or trying to end it. We told this to Allawi, to Jafari and to Maliki. We are against foreign occupation.

We do not expect much change in the American position. Some minor change, or a cosmetic change, or a tactical change. Although the public opinion in the United States is against the war, there are powerful groups in the US saying: "we will not leave empty handed after the 450 Billions we spent in Iraq." [translation thanks to Joshua Landis & friends

And on the re-emergence of Sharaa, this nugget in the early evolution of Syrian thinking on Iraq:

Sharaa also argued for the hard Syrian line on Iraq (Jihad) and resistance) in contrast to Khaddam. He probably believing that Saddam would put up more resistance than he did in opposing the American invasion. When this didn't happen and the US went on its Syria offensive, accusing Syria of aiding Iraq's Baathist deadeners, taking in Saddam's WMD, and opening a Ho Chi Min trail, Khaddam was given the Iraq portfolio. Khaddam tried to organize the Sunni tribal leaders in order to deliver them to the Americans and reopen a dialogue with Washington on the basis of delivering Iraqi Sunni cooperation for Lebanon. This strategy failed because Washington would not talk to its enemies, use diplomacy with the Syrians, or pay blackmail (whichever description you prefer). [Landis]

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UPDATE: December 10th
al-jazeerah poll:

Will Hezbollah protests bring down the Lebanese government?

Yes : 44.2 % ; No : 38.7 % ; I don't know : 17.1 %

Number of pollers:12779

$1.3 million Report of Iraq Study Group

Below is a quick outline of the seventy-nine (79) recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton, Iraq Study Group Report.

Observations:

• Parts of the document are not well organized. In particular, some of the last parts about Intelligence gathering, budgeting, and so forth should be in a section more aptly title, "Helping the U.S. to help itself, before helping Iraqis to help themselves".




• There is a prima facie tension between injunctions to withdraw support, in favor of good behavior (diplomatic quid pro quo), and imperatives to help or assist, on certain things (like bolstering the judiciary, reforming the Interior Ministry, building Iraqi counter-terror investigative abilities).




• The timeframe(s) carved out by the document are not always clear. Things like the wider regional conflict (the Arab-Israeli issues), perhaps parts of national reconciliation, and provincial (or municipal) elections are not going to be orchestrated in the short or mid term, most likely. Meanwhile, longer-term tasks are envisioned with U.S. support and participation, which may or may not occur, on the document's own calculus.




• Apart from funding refugee relief (R66), the document makes no recommendations about what to do in the event that sectarian violence is not stalled, except that it does not recommend larger force structure imperatives, which might prove short-sighted in this other context.




• For a hands-off Administrator or President, this is a daunting list ...

A SHIFT IN POLITICAL EMPHASIS, TACTICS

The document can be read as a shift in emphasis and politics, now that the Iraqis have a sovereign, central government, to putting the onus to Iraqi-led responsibility. Personally, I think that this shift ought to have been anticipated by the government in regular course and not required "fresh eyes". It's obvious that, as political control shifts, political positioning must shift to reflect a changed polity.

I believe, reading through the tea-leaves, the military has put its full support behind this shift, because they no longer want to be in Iraq a day more than necessary and have a sober view of the limits of their political influence (and, in some cases, their own dis-utility).

Still, cynics will read this necessary shift as a move toward blame-and-run. Whether it turns out that way will be a matter of watching what happens in the details, which is the only place that sincerity and good-faith can be judged, ultimately.

TOO MANY CRITICS, NOT ENOUGH ACTORS

One main thrust is that not enough people are working on Iraq, especially in the area of producing political reconciliation, forestalling catastrophe, and giving local combatants a larger local context in which to view their actions. Will 'more and diverse' attention attend resolution or just draw more parties into conflict? I suspect that risk is worth taking up.

THE RIGHT KIND OF EXTERNAL PRESSURE

Some things, like comments on the oil sector, look like sound external pressure for important change.

IF YOU DON'T LAUGH, ...

There was a bit of humor in the document, as well. In one section on setting milestones, it is noted that things that couldn't be done in 4Q06 should be done by 1Q07 (cf. R24). It is a bit ironic to be firm about milestones for others, but to be so generous with yourself.

IN THE BIG PICTURE

There is very little 'big picture' in the document. There are no sweeping recommendations or policy statements for combatting extremism, mid-term or longer-term, in the Muslim world (apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the nascent Persion-Israeli conflict). No view of what the US role is or what influence the US should seek to exert in the longer-term or how.

In some ways, this kind of 'big think' might be a distraction to getting some action on diplomatic efforts like an "Iraq Support Group". In the end, however, it may not be avoided, as it seems that the nation needs to come behind a common understanding of the threat and the short, mid, and long-term ways that the government is going to set about addressing that, which is the larger context for Iraq, to some extent.

Apart from language skills, not much on remaking the government's institutions to track an al-qa'ida threat longer-term.

Very little was given from a pure counter-insurgency perspective perspective, except a need to try to engage all groups politically.

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MY SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The External Approach



The New Diplomatic Offensive



R1: The offensive
R2: Goals of the offsensive
R3: Meeting in Baghdad of OIC or Arab League

The International Support Group



R4: Create ‘Tool’ of Iraq Group,
R5: Members of the ISG among neighbors, Arab League, 5 UNSC, the EU, others (S. Korea)
R6: Who should lead group: President or Sec of State
R7: Call on the U.N. and a U.N. Special Envoy
R8: ISG to tailor approaches to specific neighbors needs

Dealing with Syria and Iran



R9: Via ISG, engage Iran/Syria, using incentives and disincentives
“Although Iran sees as in its interest to have the US bogged down in Iraq, …”
R10: Iran’s nuclear program to be dealt with via UNSC, still
R11: ISG influence Iran



i. “Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and training to any group resorting to violence in Iraq.”
ii. “Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity of Iraq as a unified State, as well as respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its government.”
iii. “Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, to encourage national reconciliation.”
iv. “Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic reconstruction of Iraq.”

R12: US and ISG to “encourage and persuade” Syria



i. “Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent possible…”
ii. Establish hotlines to exchange information with the Iraqis
iii. Increase political and economic cooperation with Iraq

The Wider Regional Context



“The US does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding direct involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several reasons, we should act boldly.” p. 54
R13: A “renewed and sustained commitment” to A-I conflict on all “fronts”.
R14: Talks on two tracks, Syria/Lebanon, Palestinians (“who recognize Israel”)
R15 The Elements of a negotiated peace with Syria, enumerated
R16: Israelis should return the Golan, with U.S. Security Guarantee …
R17: The Elements of a negotiated peace with the Palestinians, enumerated
R18 Political, Economic, and Military support for Afghanistan




2. The Internal Approaches




Performance on Milestones



R19: Close contacts with Iraqis with “a message” of meeting milestones; public diplomacy effort to keep all relevant publics apprised.
R20: Quid pro quo: For progress in National reconciliation, security, governance, the US can make clear its continuance of efforts to train, equip, and build.
R21: Quid pro quo: Without progress, withdraw support
R22: President should “make clear” (to whom?, how?) that US does not seek permanent bases in Iraq
R23: President should “restate” that US does not seek to control Iraqi Oil

Milestones for Iraq



i. National Reconciliation related, p. 62
ii. Security, p. 63
iii. Governance, p. 63
R24: 1Q07 for anything that cannot be done in 4Q06 [!!!]
R25: Work with Iraqis to develop additional milestones

National Reconciliation



Iraqi Steps to Take



R26: Constitutional review on an urgent basis – UN has expertise to share.
R27: De de-Baathification: US “should encourage return of qualified Iraqi professionals … into the government”
R28: Oil revenue should be central gov’t and shared on the basis of population
R29: Provincial elections should have been held already
R30: “International arbitration is necessary to avert communal violence in Kirkuk”
R31 “Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching”
R32 Minority rights protected
R33 Iraqi gov’t should stop “registering” NGOs as a means of censorship of excluding certain groups

US Steps to take



R34 The future of U.S. force “on the table” to lubricate talks. UN to facilitate talks with power-brokers, not just elected officials
R35 Find a way to talk to Sistani, al-Sadr, and militia or insurgent leaders
R36 Encourage dialogue between Iraqi communities, religious leaders to offer messages of peace/reconciliation
R37 Amnesty proposals not to be undercut in Washington

The militias and national reconciliation



R38 Support the presence of international experts as advisors on disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration
R39 US to provide financial and technical expertise and legal expertise.

Security and Military Forces



For Iraq



R40: No open-ended commitment
R41: US forces should not be hostage to Iraqi gov’t inaction
R42: Training and equipping by 1Q2008
R43: Military priorities shift to train and equip
R44: Embed US forces [to accelerate] and give personnel consideration to soldiers who do
R45: More and Better Equipment

For the US (“Restoring the US Military)



R46: “Every effort” to build healthy civil-military relations, as envision by Goldwater-Nichols Act
R47: As part of redeployment, training and education programs …
R48: As equipment returns, Congress appropriate full funds to “restore the equipment to full functionality over the next five years”
R49: Budget review to assess the “full future budgetary impact of the war”

Police and Criminal Justice



Poor reforms, poor organization allows infiltration



For Iraqi government



R50: Consolidate National Police (“counterinsurgency mission”) in Ministry of Defense, not Interior
R51: Transfer Border Police to Ministry of Defense (current role resembles little of ordinary border policing)“Accomplishing these goals will not be easy, and the presence of American advisors will be required to help Iraqis …”
R52: Iraqi Police Service more authority to conduct investigations and integrate with judicial prosecution
R53: Reform Ministry of Interior – expanded role in criminal pursuit, sole authority to pay Police
R54: Ministry of Interior – control the Facilities Protection Services and/or demobilize it

For US



R55: Continue Mission to train National police and Border police
R56: US DOJ should “direct” the training of forces in reformed Interior Ministry
R57: Expand police training and training force
R58: FBI to expand forensic facilities, equipment, training in Iraq (Iraqi Police Services)
R59: Iraqi gov’t spend money to upgrade communications/equipment of Iraqi Police Services
R60: US DOJ to work alongside Iraqi Ministry of Interior to transform its practices and procedures
R61: Fully fund and vigorously support DOJ efforts to build Iraqi judiciary, harden Iraqi judicial facilities, and build out services.

The Oil Sector
“Even if Iraq were peaceful tomorrow, oil production would decline unless current problems in the oil sector were addressed.”



Short-term: R62 [five parts]: Legal Clarity; South to work-over at own expense; calibrate local tribe payments to throughput to protect oil infrastructure; immediate metering to raise accountability; “in conjunction with the IMF” to stop subsidizing energy sector/energy consumption
Long-term: R63 [five-parts]: Encourage external investment; reorganize oil industry as a commercial enterprise’ combat corruption (use transparency); use World Bank’s best practices on contracting; improve management

US Economic and Reconstruction Assistance



R64: Econ assistance should increase to a level of $5 billion, not be permitted to decline
R65: More involvement of others, beyond just funding
R66: Fund relief of refugee problem (UN High Commissioner)
Coordination of Econ Assistance



R67: President should create a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction

Effectiveness



R68: Chief of Mission should have discretion over funds and de-funding projects in which Iraqi partnership is lacking
R69: Renew Special IG for Iraq
R70: Improve inter-agency (“flexibility”)
R71: End whatever US-only funding of projects

Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review



R72: On-budget for FY2008

US Personnel



R73: Develop professional language skills
R74: Directed assignments, if not enough volunteers
R75: “longer term” rethink inter-agency along the lines of Goldwater-Nichols
R76: State Department, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture – all need to tool for long-term stability operations

Intelligence Services p. 93



R77: More resources to understanding the threats and sources of violence inside Iraq
R78: Immediate changes to data collection to get a more accurate picture of violence and its perpetrators




Iraqi Actions



R79: CIA to add personnel to train an Iraqi counter-terror effort

Quotus re Quotus - Counterinsurgency quote for the day

Unlike Alice talking to the Cheshire cat, sometimes you don't know where you are, even if you know where you are going:

From the Princeton Project on National Security (link):

...both counterinsurgencies and counterterrorist campaigns share another troublesome similarity: the difficulty of determining who is "winning." Body counts and other measures of effectiveness (MOEs) drawn from traditional conventional wars provide misleading indicators... Indeed, as ... Rumsfeld pointedly asked in 2003, "are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the [religious schools] and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?"*...

Even in retrospect, it is difficult to determine which factors had the most impact on the course of the fighting and if and when a turning point occurred. Given these conflicts' protracted nature and the absence of major military engagements, it is also important to understand the adversary's measures of success and to distinguish between short-term MOEs (terrorist leaders eliminated, funds blocked, etc.) and long-term indicators of progress (democratization of the Middle East, de-legitimization of terrorism, etc.).

The American Experience in Vietnam underscores this measurement problem. The CIA established a Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to provide MOEs for the pacification campaign. This computer-based system incorporated monthly feedback ... Despite these endeavors, the HES could not overcome the perception that it exaggerated progress in pacification, especially before the 1968 Tet offensive.

History provides other examples of the difficulty in assessing an ongoing insurgency. In Algeria and Vietnam, the French and Americans "won" almost every battle until they lost the war, while for a long time in Malaya the British justly feared another defeat in their effort to retain their original colonial empire. Terrorist campaigns also have been replete with rapid and unanticipated changes in fortune. In the early 1980s, the Lebanese terrorist group Hizbollah achieved a sudden triumph after several of its operatives inflicted devastating suicide strikes...

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*It has been reported, as I recall, the Rummy's DoD actually went through this estimation exercise and that the preliminary results were not laudatory, therefore the reports were sent back for re-working. I don't have a reference, but I believe I read it either in RicK's or Suskind's reporting.