Sizing Up the Baghdad Conurbation II

Not having a back-of-the-hand knowledge of Iraqi geography, I often find news reports that reference towns and cities without adequate graphics to be hard to judge.

It's been hard to find decent maps of Baghdad, ones that are easily usable. Here is my ongoing effort to add dimension to empower readers. (By the way, if you don't know what a "conurbation" is perhaps that's enough to inspire a budding geographer).

The General Areas

Basic Ethnicities:
* Adhamiyah: Sunni majority, Shiite presence.

A majority Sunni area on the eastern side of the Tigris River, A'dhamiyah is home to the shrine of Imam Abu Hanifa, an eighth century Sunni scholar, and the Imam al Adham mosque, built above the shrine and for whom A'dhamiyah is named. Under Saddam Hussein, A'dhamiyah was considered one of the most affluent neighborhoods in Baghdad, home to political leaders, professionals and business people. During the first days of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam Hussein was believed to be hiding in A'dhamiyah before heading north to his hometown of Tikrit. Today, A'dhamiyah still is considered a middle class Sunni neighborhood, with minority Shiites being rapidly expelled. And, despite the establishment of a neighborhood patrol, attacks are frequently carried out on Iraqi security forces and American troops in the area.-PBS News (date unknown)

* al-Kadhimya: Shiite majority.

Kadhimiyah is considered one of the safest and most peaceful areas of Baghdad. The shrine of Imam Musa al-Kadhim located here is heavily protected and the neighborhood is home to a large American military base. A mostly residential area, Kadhimiyah is second only to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala to Shiites. According to Iraqis living in Baghdad, few outsiders venture into Kadhimiyah because of its location to the north, its relatively small size and generations of families helping keep it safe. In August 2005, the bridge connecting Kadhimiyah to Adhamiyah across the Tigris River was the scene of a deadly stampede that killed an estimated 1,000 people. Once a highly cosmopolitan area of the city with predominantly Shiites and some Sunni professionals living harmoniously, few Sunnis remain.-PBS News (date unknown)

* Karrada: Shiite majority, Christian presence.

One of Baghdad's most upscale neighborhoods, Karrada sits in the southeastern part of Baghdad where the Tigris River bends and forms a horseshoe before heading south. The neighborhood is almost fully surrounded by the river and has infrastructure in good condition, some office buildings, banks and stores, along with some of the best restaurants and nightlife in Baghdad. Considered a culturally mixed, cosmopolitan area with a variety of writers, artists and intellectuals, Karrada is home to mostly Shiites, many Sunnis and pockets of Christians, but also foreigners. Though thought of as a generally safe area, the neighborhood has witnessed several car bombings, and in March 2004 was the site of a deadly bombing at the Jabal Lebanon hotel that killed 27 people.-PBS News (date unknown)

* Al-Mansour: Mixed area.

Saddam Hussein's son, Uday Hussein, lived in the Mansour district, an upper class area of Baghdad. In the 1990s, Uday was known to cruise the streets of the neighborhood scouting for young women. An attempt was made on Uday's life in 1996 -- his Porche was riddled with bullets and he was shot 17 times -- some say at the hands of the family of a young girl he had raped. Others say residents of Dujail, a town north of Baghdad where 148 Shiites were massacred in 1982, were the would-be assassins. Under Saddam, Mansour was home to artists, writers, business people and military officers. In 2003, during the toppling of Baghdad, the Al Jazeera news network accused the U.S. military of protecting the Ministry of Oil, located in Mansour, while letting other parts of the city burn. Today, parts of Mansour lie in the coalition-controlled Green Zone, and the area, once home to foreign embassies, boasts the best infrastructure in Baghdad.-PBS News (date unknown)

* Dora: Mixed area.

Famous for housing one of the largest oil refineries in Iraq, Dora is a mixed Sunni, Christian neighborhood with a Shiite minority. Since 2005, Sunni extremists have worked to expel Shiites from the neighborhood, drawing retaliation from armed Shiites who entered the neighborhood from other Shiite strongholds to provide protection. One of the main areas of conflict in Baghdad, Dora has been the site of bloody clashes between insurgents and American troops. The area also has seen a slew of abductions, bombings and assassinations.-PBS News (date unknown)

* Baghdad Al-Jadida (New Baghdad): Shiite majority, Christian presence.

Called New Baghdad in English, Baghdad al-Jadida was created in the 1950s under a land expansion program and was populated by mainly middle class, working Baghdadis. Residents were salaried bureaucrats, many educated and working for the government. Today, Baghdad al-Jadida is a mixed Shiite-Sunni area with a Shiite majority and a small population of Christians. The area is residential, lightly industrial with family-owned businesses that cater to the neighborhood. Residents typically bus to central Baghdad for work. The neighborhood, considered relatively safe, was the site of a suicide bombing at a crowded gas station in February 2006 that killed 23 people and wounded 51.-PBS News (date unknown)

* Sadr City [Thawra]: Almost exclusively Shiite.

A Shiite slum of some 2 million people in the northwest section of Baghdad, Sadr City, once called Saddam City, was renamed for a prominent Shiite religious family after the dictator's fall. The area was built in the late 1950s, part of a scheme carried out by Iraq's first dictator Abdul Karim Qasim. At that time, poverty-stricken residents were given tents as homes. They served as the labor force for the rest of Baghdad. The area was once the headquarters of the Sadr Foundation, a religious organization headed by Grand Ayatollah Muhammad al Sadr, father of rebel Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr. The organization ran hospitals and provided services for the poor. Today, Sadr City residents, who still live in extreme poverty, have concrete homes and running water but little in the way of infrastructure -- the worst in Baghdad, according to many. The area is the stronghold of Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. In November 2006, Sadr City was the scene of one of the worst bombings in Iraq's history. The bombings -- a series of attacks that killed more than 200 people -- led to a five-day curfew.-PBS News (date unknown)

* Hurriya City [near "Kadymiha" in general pic above]: Shiite majority, Sunni presence.

Hurriya City is mainly Shiite with a small Sunni population that is quickly disappearing. The area, like Shu'la and Sadr City, is a stronghold of rebel Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. Socioeconomic conditions are poor as is the infrastructure. Hurriya is a lower middle-class, residential neighborhood that along with Sadr City and Shu'la comprises nearly half of Baghdad's population.-PBS News (date unknown)

* al Shula [South-eastern part of "Kadymiha" in general pic above]

Shu'la is another Shiite enclave that has witnessed the mass expulsion of its small Sunni population. Like Sadr City and Hurriya, Shu'la is controlled by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. The area is poor and considered a slum by most Baghdad residents. In Iraq's first election since Saddam Hussein's ouster, residents of Shu'la voted largely for the Shiite-led United Iraqi Alliance in 2005.-PBS News (date unknown)

Ad-hoc map of ethnic mixes:



Population estimates of major areas:

Major Cities		Governate	Population 1987 SOURCE	Population 2002 SOURCE
Baghdad Conurbation
1	BAGHDAD	Baghdad	3,841,268	5,605,000
	Kadhimain		521,444
	Adhamiya		464,151
	Mamoon		244,545
	Karradah Sharqiyah		235,554
	Abu Ghurayb
	Sadr City
Other Cities
2	Mosul	Nineveh / Ninawa	664,221	1,739,000
3	Basrah	Basrah	406,296	1,337,000
4	Irbil	Arbil	485,968	839,000
5	Kirkuk	At-Ta'mim	418,624	728,000
6	Sulaymaniyah	As-Sulaymaniyah	364,096	643,000
7	Najaf	An-Najaf	309,010	563,000
8	Karbala	Karbala	296,705	549,000
9	Nasriye	Dhi-Qar	265,937	535,000
10	Hilla	Babylon [Babil]	268,834	524,000
11	Ramadiyah [Ar Ramadi]	Al-Anbar	192,556	423,000
12	Diwaniyeh	Al-Qadisiyah	196,519	421,000
13	Kut	Wasit	183,183	381,000
14	Amarah	Maysan	208,797	340,000
15	Ba'qubah	Diyala		280,000
16	Fallujah	Al-Anbar		256,000
17	Samarra'	Salah ad-Din		201,000
18	Az Zubayr	Basrah		168,000
19	Tall 'Afar	Nineveh / Ninawa		155,000
20	As-Samawah	Al-Muthanná		124,000
21	Bayji			120,000
22	al-Kûfah	An-Najaf		115,000
23	as-Satrah	Diyala		83,000
	Ad Duluiyah			50,000
	Dahuk	Dahuk		47,000
	Tikrit	Salah ad-Din		28,000

Sizing Up Baghdad

The folks over at cockeyed.com have kindly provided the comparisons, to give a sense to readers of the relative size of Baghdad and its suburbs compared to known size of various U.S. cities:

Baghdad:


Los Angeles:

New York:

Chicago:

San Francisco:

Washington, D.C.:

Rummy Accepts Medal, Schedules Town Meeting, Farewell Set for 15th

Sec Def Donald Rumsfeld accepted the Union League's Gold Medal a week ago or so. According to Defenselink, Gates will assume responsibility on the 18th and Rummy's farewell party is the 15th.

One last chance to soak up Rummyspeak:

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(AP Photo/Haraz N. Ghanbari)

In a surprise move, Sec Def Rumsfeld takes a ... quasi-victory lap, visiting troops in Iraq on Dec. 9th ...

The Second "Thumpin'" - Comments on ISG Report

Presidential Historian, Michael Beschloss, in Newsweek:

History suggests that Baker-Hamilton’s ultimate contribution may be whatever outside pressure it generates on President Bush and Congress to achieve a bipartisan solution in Iraq.

The times in history when such panels have had the greatest impact have been when they provided a president with the mechanics and bipartisan blessing to do what he probably wanted to do anyway. The best two examples are both from the Reagan years. In 1981, President Reagan appointed an expert commission led by Alan Greenspan (not yet Fed chairman) to suggest how to fix that generation’s Social Security problems.

Six years later, besieged by the Iran-contra scandal, Reagan appointed a bipartisan group headed by Texas Republican Sen. John Tower to suggest how to revise White House management to exclude the future possibility of unauthorized covert operations. By promptly accepting the Tower Commission’s wise recommendations and admitting his mistakes, Reagan helped to save his presidency.

One reason the Tower findings were so briskly accepted was the expertise of the commission’s staff director, who knew how important it was for the president to take its report seriously. This was a young lawyer named Stephen Hadley, who has gone on to become President Bush’s national-security adviser.

George F. Will, in WaPo:

The Iraq Study Group, like the policy it was created to critique, was overtaken by the unexpectedly rapid crumbling of the U.S. position in Iraq since the ISG was formed in March.
...
Also in the week before the ISG's report, the leaked Donald Rumsfeld memo urged policy to "go minimalist." That is generally good advice to government, but much of the rest of the memo, with its 21 "illustrative new courses of action" -- a large number, and evidence that none is especially promising -- echoed the 1960s Great Society confidence in government-engineered behavior modification...

The ISG's central conclusion, important to say with the group's imprimatur even though the conclusion is obvious, is that the problem with Iraq is the Iraqis, a semi-nation of peoples who are very difficult to help.

Syria weighs in, again, on Iraq

Vice President weighs in here, with Syrian perspective and demands that include a fixed timetable under the 'excuse' of fighting 'occupiers'.

In reference to a Syrian worry about a widening conflagration coming out of a deteriorating Iraq, he either directly calls the Baker-Hamilton bluff or opens public negotiations by mitigating it:

As for the notion of an international conference on Iraq, many European countries have recommended it to us. We support the formula but only if we know what the intended outcome of such a conference is. It has to have reasonable objectives that we can agree to work for.

We will not support just any political process in Iraq, we will support it only when it takes into account the interests of all the different groups in Iraq, when the Unity of the country is preserved, and when there is a time table for withdrawal (of US troops)

The US has failed terribly in Iraq. The Baker-Hamilton Report is an indication that the American people are waking up to the fact that they have been badly deceived by their government in Iraq. Some say that through dialogue with Syria and Iran, Iraq can be stabilized. We are not so arrogant as to believe that Syria can single-handedly solve the Iraq problem, which will have repercussions throughout the world. Perhaps not even all countries working together can help solve Iraq's problem, but it is incumbent on us to have the modesty to listen to each other and to try what we can.

We will not help any Iraqi leader who isn't against the occupation of Iraq or trying to end it. We told this to Allawi, to Jafari and to Maliki. We are against foreign occupation.

We do not expect much change in the American position. Some minor change, or a cosmetic change, or a tactical change. Although the public opinion in the United States is against the war, there are powerful groups in the US saying: "we will not leave empty handed after the 450 Billions we spent in Iraq." [translation thanks to Joshua Landis & friends

And on the re-emergence of Sharaa, this nugget in the early evolution of Syrian thinking on Iraq:

Sharaa also argued for the hard Syrian line on Iraq (Jihad) and resistance) in contrast to Khaddam. He probably believing that Saddam would put up more resistance than he did in opposing the American invasion. When this didn't happen and the US went on its Syria offensive, accusing Syria of aiding Iraq's Baathist deadeners, taking in Saddam's WMD, and opening a Ho Chi Min trail, Khaddam was given the Iraq portfolio. Khaddam tried to organize the Sunni tribal leaders in order to deliver them to the Americans and reopen a dialogue with Washington on the basis of delivering Iraqi Sunni cooperation for Lebanon. This strategy failed because Washington would not talk to its enemies, use diplomacy with the Syrians, or pay blackmail (whichever description you prefer). [Landis]

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UPDATE: December 10th
al-jazeerah poll:

Will Hezbollah protests bring down the Lebanese government?

Yes : 44.2 % ; No : 38.7 % ; I don't know : 17.1 %

Number of pollers:12779

$1.3 million Report of Iraq Study Group

Below is a quick outline of the seventy-nine (79) recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton, Iraq Study Group Report.

Observations:

• Parts of the document are not well organized. In particular, some of the last parts about Intelligence gathering, budgeting, and so forth should be in a section more aptly title, "Helping the U.S. to help itself, before helping Iraqis to help themselves".




• There is a prima facie tension between injunctions to withdraw support, in favor of good behavior (diplomatic quid pro quo), and imperatives to help or assist, on certain things (like bolstering the judiciary, reforming the Interior Ministry, building Iraqi counter-terror investigative abilities).




• The timeframe(s) carved out by the document are not always clear. Things like the wider regional conflict (the Arab-Israeli issues), perhaps parts of national reconciliation, and provincial (or municipal) elections are not going to be orchestrated in the short or mid term, most likely. Meanwhile, longer-term tasks are envisioned with U.S. support and participation, which may or may not occur, on the document's own calculus.




• Apart from funding refugee relief (R66), the document makes no recommendations about what to do in the event that sectarian violence is not stalled, except that it does not recommend larger force structure imperatives, which might prove short-sighted in this other context.




• For a hands-off Administrator or President, this is a daunting list ...

A SHIFT IN POLITICAL EMPHASIS, TACTICS

The document can be read as a shift in emphasis and politics, now that the Iraqis have a sovereign, central government, to putting the onus to Iraqi-led responsibility. Personally, I think that this shift ought to have been anticipated by the government in regular course and not required "fresh eyes". It's obvious that, as political control shifts, political positioning must shift to reflect a changed polity.

I believe, reading through the tea-leaves, the military has put its full support behind this shift, because they no longer want to be in Iraq a day more than necessary and have a sober view of the limits of their political influence (and, in some cases, their own dis-utility).

Still, cynics will read this necessary shift as a move toward blame-and-run. Whether it turns out that way will be a matter of watching what happens in the details, which is the only place that sincerity and good-faith can be judged, ultimately.

TOO MANY CRITICS, NOT ENOUGH ACTORS

One main thrust is that not enough people are working on Iraq, especially in the area of producing political reconciliation, forestalling catastrophe, and giving local combatants a larger local context in which to view their actions. Will 'more and diverse' attention attend resolution or just draw more parties into conflict? I suspect that risk is worth taking up.

THE RIGHT KIND OF EXTERNAL PRESSURE

Some things, like comments on the oil sector, look like sound external pressure for important change.

IF YOU DON'T LAUGH, ...

There was a bit of humor in the document, as well. In one section on setting milestones, it is noted that things that couldn't be done in 4Q06 should be done by 1Q07 (cf. R24). It is a bit ironic to be firm about milestones for others, but to be so generous with yourself.

IN THE BIG PICTURE

There is very little 'big picture' in the document. There are no sweeping recommendations or policy statements for combatting extremism, mid-term or longer-term, in the Muslim world (apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the nascent Persion-Israeli conflict). No view of what the US role is or what influence the US should seek to exert in the longer-term or how.

In some ways, this kind of 'big think' might be a distraction to getting some action on diplomatic efforts like an "Iraq Support Group". In the end, however, it may not be avoided, as it seems that the nation needs to come behind a common understanding of the threat and the short, mid, and long-term ways that the government is going to set about addressing that, which is the larger context for Iraq, to some extent.

Apart from language skills, not much on remaking the government's institutions to track an al-qa'ida threat longer-term.

Very little was given from a pure counter-insurgency perspective perspective, except a need to try to engage all groups politically.

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MY SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The External Approach



The New Diplomatic Offensive



R1: The offensive
R2: Goals of the offsensive
R3: Meeting in Baghdad of OIC or Arab League

The International Support Group



R4: Create ‘Tool’ of Iraq Group,
R5: Members of the ISG among neighbors, Arab League, 5 UNSC, the EU, others (S. Korea)
R6: Who should lead group: President or Sec of State
R7: Call on the U.N. and a U.N. Special Envoy
R8: ISG to tailor approaches to specific neighbors needs

Dealing with Syria and Iran



R9: Via ISG, engage Iran/Syria, using incentives and disincentives
“Although Iran sees as in its interest to have the US bogged down in Iraq, …”
R10: Iran’s nuclear program to be dealt with via UNSC, still
R11: ISG influence Iran



i. “Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and training to any group resorting to violence in Iraq.”
ii. “Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity of Iraq as a unified State, as well as respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its government.”
iii. “Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, to encourage national reconciliation.”
iv. “Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic reconstruction of Iraq.”

R12: US and ISG to “encourage and persuade” Syria



i. “Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent possible…”
ii. Establish hotlines to exchange information with the Iraqis
iii. Increase political and economic cooperation with Iraq

The Wider Regional Context



“The US does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding direct involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several reasons, we should act boldly.” p. 54
R13: A “renewed and sustained commitment” to A-I conflict on all “fronts”.
R14: Talks on two tracks, Syria/Lebanon, Palestinians (“who recognize Israel”)
R15 The Elements of a negotiated peace with Syria, enumerated
R16: Israelis should return the Golan, with U.S. Security Guarantee …
R17: The Elements of a negotiated peace with the Palestinians, enumerated
R18 Political, Economic, and Military support for Afghanistan




2. The Internal Approaches




Performance on Milestones



R19: Close contacts with Iraqis with “a message” of meeting milestones; public diplomacy effort to keep all relevant publics apprised.
R20: Quid pro quo: For progress in National reconciliation, security, governance, the US can make clear its continuance of efforts to train, equip, and build.
R21: Quid pro quo: Without progress, withdraw support
R22: President should “make clear” (to whom?, how?) that US does not seek permanent bases in Iraq
R23: President should “restate” that US does not seek to control Iraqi Oil

Milestones for Iraq



i. National Reconciliation related, p. 62
ii. Security, p. 63
iii. Governance, p. 63
R24: 1Q07 for anything that cannot be done in 4Q06 [!!!]
R25: Work with Iraqis to develop additional milestones

National Reconciliation



Iraqi Steps to Take



R26: Constitutional review on an urgent basis – UN has expertise to share.
R27: De de-Baathification: US “should encourage return of qualified Iraqi professionals … into the government”
R28: Oil revenue should be central gov’t and shared on the basis of population
R29: Provincial elections should have been held already
R30: “International arbitration is necessary to avert communal violence in Kirkuk”
R31 “Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching”
R32 Minority rights protected
R33 Iraqi gov’t should stop “registering” NGOs as a means of censorship of excluding certain groups

US Steps to take



R34 The future of U.S. force “on the table” to lubricate talks. UN to facilitate talks with power-brokers, not just elected officials
R35 Find a way to talk to Sistani, al-Sadr, and militia or insurgent leaders
R36 Encourage dialogue between Iraqi communities, religious leaders to offer messages of peace/reconciliation
R37 Amnesty proposals not to be undercut in Washington

The militias and national reconciliation



R38 Support the presence of international experts as advisors on disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration
R39 US to provide financial and technical expertise and legal expertise.

Security and Military Forces



For Iraq



R40: No open-ended commitment
R41: US forces should not be hostage to Iraqi gov’t inaction
R42: Training and equipping by 1Q2008
R43: Military priorities shift to train and equip
R44: Embed US forces [to accelerate] and give personnel consideration to soldiers who do
R45: More and Better Equipment

For the US (“Restoring the US Military)



R46: “Every effort” to build healthy civil-military relations, as envision by Goldwater-Nichols Act
R47: As part of redeployment, training and education programs …
R48: As equipment returns, Congress appropriate full funds to “restore the equipment to full functionality over the next five years”
R49: Budget review to assess the “full future budgetary impact of the war”

Police and Criminal Justice



Poor reforms, poor organization allows infiltration



For Iraqi government



R50: Consolidate National Police (“counterinsurgency mission”) in Ministry of Defense, not Interior
R51: Transfer Border Police to Ministry of Defense (current role resembles little of ordinary border policing)“Accomplishing these goals will not be easy, and the presence of American advisors will be required to help Iraqis …”
R52: Iraqi Police Service more authority to conduct investigations and integrate with judicial prosecution
R53: Reform Ministry of Interior – expanded role in criminal pursuit, sole authority to pay Police
R54: Ministry of Interior – control the Facilities Protection Services and/or demobilize it

For US



R55: Continue Mission to train National police and Border police
R56: US DOJ should “direct” the training of forces in reformed Interior Ministry
R57: Expand police training and training force
R58: FBI to expand forensic facilities, equipment, training in Iraq (Iraqi Police Services)
R59: Iraqi gov’t spend money to upgrade communications/equipment of Iraqi Police Services
R60: US DOJ to work alongside Iraqi Ministry of Interior to transform its practices and procedures
R61: Fully fund and vigorously support DOJ efforts to build Iraqi judiciary, harden Iraqi judicial facilities, and build out services.

The Oil Sector
“Even if Iraq were peaceful tomorrow, oil production would decline unless current problems in the oil sector were addressed.”



Short-term: R62 [five parts]: Legal Clarity; South to work-over at own expense; calibrate local tribe payments to throughput to protect oil infrastructure; immediate metering to raise accountability; “in conjunction with the IMF” to stop subsidizing energy sector/energy consumption
Long-term: R63 [five-parts]: Encourage external investment; reorganize oil industry as a commercial enterprise’ combat corruption (use transparency); use World Bank’s best practices on contracting; improve management

US Economic and Reconstruction Assistance



R64: Econ assistance should increase to a level of $5 billion, not be permitted to decline
R65: More involvement of others, beyond just funding
R66: Fund relief of refugee problem (UN High Commissioner)
Coordination of Econ Assistance



R67: President should create a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction

Effectiveness



R68: Chief of Mission should have discretion over funds and de-funding projects in which Iraqi partnership is lacking
R69: Renew Special IG for Iraq
R70: Improve inter-agency (“flexibility”)
R71: End whatever US-only funding of projects

Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review



R72: On-budget for FY2008

US Personnel



R73: Develop professional language skills
R74: Directed assignments, if not enough volunteers
R75: “longer term” rethink inter-agency along the lines of Goldwater-Nichols
R76: State Department, Treasury, Justice, Agriculture – all need to tool for long-term stability operations

Intelligence Services p. 93



R77: More resources to understanding the threats and sources of violence inside Iraq
R78: Immediate changes to data collection to get a more accurate picture of violence and its perpetrators




Iraqi Actions



R79: CIA to add personnel to train an Iraqi counter-terror effort

al-Hakim's Visit from Iraq and Military Experience

Abdul Azziz al-Hakim, Iraqi SCIR (photo-link pbs.org)

Well, it's a good thing that Iraqis are getting out and about. I hope there is a lot more of this to come. There are times when the drivel coming out of Qom, say, is so illustrative of people thinking in isolation that it is painful.

Meanwhile, we have to wonder about his military experience. True, the Badr Brigades may have furnish experience of a kind. However, those with a longer memory might be harkened to worry that the kind of "put down" of the Sunni insurgency that he seems to favor is precisely the thing that might scuttle longer-term hopes for a reconciliation. I recall that Musharaf counciled the U.S. strongly in backing the Northen Alliance not to allow 'massacres', the likes of which had only re-inforced age-old problems with fresh blood.

Anyway, quoting (hat tip, spencer):

"The strikes that [Sunni insurgents, takfiris -- his term -- and Baathists] are getting from the multinational forces are not hard enough to put an end to their acts, but leave them [to] stand up again to resume their criminal acts. This means that there is something wrong in the policies taken to deal with that danger threatening the lives of the Iraqis. Eliminating the danger of the Civil War in Iraq could only be achieved through directing decisive strikes against takfiris [the prepared statement, corrected by the translator, reads "terrorists" here], Baathists [and] terrorists in Iraq. Otherwise we'll continue to witness massacres being committed every now and then against the innocent Iraqis."

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(Background: PBS Newhour, see pic-link)
"Iraqi Shiite Muslim leader Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim was one of at least 75 people killed when a car bomb exploded at the main mosque in the Iraqi holy city of Najaf during prayers on Friday [Aug 2003].

The explosion carved out a crater about 3.5 feet deep in the street in front of the mosque, which is one of the holiest in Iraq and contains the shrine of Imam Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed. An Iraqi hospital official put the death toll at 75. Thousands of people in Najaf filled the streets outside the mosque to search through rubble for victims.

Among the dead was al-Hakim, who had just delivered a sermon calling for Iraqi unity. Al-Hakim, 64, was the spiritual leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, one of the top Shiite groups opposed to the toppled Saddam Hussein regime."

Zakaria: Extricate Now from Sectarian Strife

The assumptions for the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq are probably violated by the emergence of sectarian violence, either entrenched but small or passing but escalating/large.

MORE TO DO BEFORE HEADING FOR THE EXIT?

In his recent piece, Zakaria goes one step farther, suggesting that the appropriate re-make of that strategy is retrenchment in the form of exit.

I have a question about whether the U.S. can walk a middle line, without becoming truly hated for its efforts. Would it be possible to add more troops to stall the Sunni Insurgency and to strengthen the lawful constraints on the Shia government, either by fiat or by manipulating the levers of the government to keep the "extra-judicial" Sadrists 'contained' or 'constrained' under judicial enforcement. In other words, is there a way to position the effort so as to continue to fight for law-and-order, which is how the U.S. might garner credibility and where others can lose legitimacy?

A guarantee of the sanctity of the ballot box is another reason to argue for a continued U.S. presence. Perhaps that doesn't make sense in a full-blown civil war scenario, the upshot of which is the consolidation of the ballot box by violent means. Still, if the outcome is imperfect, the U.S. might have a role to play, rather than turn the whole course of events over to other parties.

One wonders if the Arab street might ever turn against further sectarian violence. It wasn't so long ago that there was great hand wringing that non-Muslims were going to destroy the ancient city of Baghdad (bombs), but what about the al-qa'ida, the sunni insurgency, and the reprisal militia destruction? Can that all be forgiven, without even a groan?

ARE ALL THE WINNING CARDS ALREADY DEALT AND PLAYED?

There are other political cards to play. Withdrawal is not the only way to incent Iraqi cooperation. It might be possible to suggest an end to a central government, for a period, on the grounds that it is not supplying any public goods (and violating its constitutional oath).

It might also be possible to curb Iran by threatening an independent Kurdish state, something that would be very dangerous to the Iranian Mullah oligarchy (of course, Turkey would have to be insiders to this threat).

Syria can be easily pressured too, in a true game of brinkmanship. If both Iraq and Lebanon fall into a broad-based civil war in the next 12 months, Syria will be at its weakest point in decades, maybe.

TO BOLDLY GO: UP TO THE TASK?

None of these are guranteed, but it does seem that there are political pressure points yet to be pressed. Perhaps President Bush doesn't have the mind for this kind of chess. He seems to prefer a business-like or Texan way of "looking people in the eye" and saying that they are "a man of peace" or "deserving of a chance".

In some ways, the CIC seems hampered by his or his general's willingness to 'think Big', not in ideological terms, but in practical terms of what might be required to tip the scales beyond mere capture and kill. I cannot help but think that there would be a sharp psychological impact, in the short run, if a massive force of 50,000+ troops marched into Baghdad (U.S. or otherwise). Declaration of martial law, a high-tech intelligence effort to find out who is in the city and where, and the holding of municipal elections, so that the Sunni can have another try at getting included in local councils and the political track can have a chance.

The temporary use of large-scale force can have some effects, like returning a temporary sense of normality, re-iterating that there are true political choices to be made (not just chaos/hopelessness to be submitted to). A large, mobile force could also be re-deployed for perimeter operations elsewhere, which are also a part of clear-hold-build, at various stages.

CHAOS ISN'T JUST FOR BREAKFAST ANYMORE

Separately, I have to say, with great sadness, however, that I've seen the first convincing evidence for the second of my own two conditions for prescribing a stand-aside strategy on the blog that Zakaria mentions, Model Iraq. (I don't say what they are, lest they become self-fulfilling).

On my own account, the campaign is on borrowed time, playing against the odds, as it were, for an outcome that will not involve substantially more violence. The only thing that prevents more conviction on this score is that I continue to feel that I don't have sufficient information about the whole situation.

IF THE WORST IS YET TO COME, RETREAT IS ONLY THE BEGINNING

Iraq is not Vietnam. There are reasons to believe that a full-scale civil war might be self-contained, but also reason to believe that it could draw in other partners, especially as part of the end-game. In other words, if the Shia start to "win", the temptation for neighbors will be to assist the Sunni, etc. The Yemeni civil war drew in outside participants, lasted seven years, and ended in a compromise as the parties realized that foreign offers of help weren't going to resolve the situation.

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Update: Suadi Arabia signalling in strongest possible terms that it will not stand aside in a Iraqi Civil War precipitated despite or because of a U.S. withdrawal:

Because King Abdullah has been working to minimize sectarian tensions in Iraq and reconcile Sunni and Shiite communities, because he gave President Bush his word that he wouldn't meddle in Iraq (and because it would be impossible to ensure that Saudi-funded militias wouldn't attack U.S. troops), these requests have all been refused. They will, however, be heeded if American troops begin a phased withdrawal from Iraq. As the economic powerhouse of the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam and the de facto leader of the world's Sunni community (which comprises 85 percent of all Muslims), Saudi Arabia has both the means and the religious responsibility to intervene.

Writing in the WaPo, the author is a Saudi insider.

The Knife's Edge: Beyond Constructive Tension, At the Limit of Reason

Nothing to add to this. Speaks for itself.

KING ABDULLAH: Well, ..., the difficulty that we're tackling with here is, we're juggling with the strong potential of three civil wars in the region, whether it's the Palestinians, that of Lebanon or of Iraq.

And I hope that my discussions, at least, with the president will be to provide whatever we can do for the Iraqi people. But at the same time, we do want to concentrate ourselves on the core issues, which we believe are the Palestinians and the Palestinian peace process, because that is a must today, as well as the tremendous concern we've had over the past several days, what's happening in Lebanon.

And we could possibly imagine going into 2007 and having three civil wars on our hands. And therefore, it is time that we really take a strong step forward as part of the international community and make sure we avert the Middle East from a tremendous crisis that I fear, and I see could possibly happen in 2007.

The al-qa'ida strategy to increase sectarian strife ... works.

Is the 'logic' of retaliation inexorable? Are the forces of chaos always stronger in the short term? The long-term? Are people necessarily at the mercy of their prejudices, even in the face of a greater enemy? Can 'conditions' be arranged that 'force' retaliation, and a spiral of escalation? Can a few dictate the path for the whole, in that regard, without fail? Is it a question of once it starts, the chance to stop it has ended, the fate sealed (a one-shot deal; an pound of prevention to prevent a disease that must run its course if caught)?

Are there any gains to be consolidated from sectarian strife? Is it really a path to military success and political control?

There may be some game-theoretic approaches to these question. One wonders if the Army is up to speed on that, let alone the civilian leadership.