A Deadly Revolving Door

One starts to see how Saddam's system of nesting groups to watch other groups (including "stiffners") may have gotten its impetus: weak policing within the ranks.

For at least the second time in the past 5 months, some of the most dangerous terrorists have been able to escape from an Iraqi jail guarded by Iraqi police. Today, militants stormed Mosul's northwestern Badoush prison and freed over 140 prisoners, most of whom are described as "insurgents." You can bet they weren't traffic violators; they were probably key operatives in terrorist cells who were painstakingly hunted down by the U.S. military and Iraqi army. The overwhelmed police asked the U.S. military for help, but too late to stop the escaping terrorists - Andrew Cochran, CT Blog

The Struggle for the Future of Islam: One Tribe, One Bullet at a Time

I had just been writing about the Pandora's box that threatens to rewrite the long-term struggle inside Islam to one based predominantly on Sunni vs. Shi'a politics (also just writing about COP Falcon in Ramadi).

While we ogle potential changes in the conceptual landscape, we know also know that the daily epiphanies in almost any struggle come down to individuals who will write History with the success or failure of their moral conviction in action.

Accordingly, I point out this post from the guys at the Fourth Rail (where else?), who have this to observe:

The U.S. now estimated 12 of the 21 tribes in Ramadi actively support the government, 6 are neutral and three have sided with al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda has fired back with a vicious campaign of suicide attacks, murders and kidnappings of tribal leaders in an attempt to intimidate the Anbar tribes. Last year, a captured document showed al-Qaeda's 'hit list' of Sunni politicians, tribal leaders, clerics and Baathists in Anbar.

If you read the rest of the post, you get a long list of complaints of what al-qaeda hath wrought in al-Anbar.

Coupled with the Mecca Declaration, perhaps some of the animus of 'fighting occupation' might abate. The question is will it be enough or will enough people continue to struggle without their ideological 'cover story', as it were.

It is also a question of timing, perhaps. The Shi'a led unity government might come up with yet another display of unbelievable incompetence, which would provide another "rationale" and provocation to supplant the old one(s)...

Refugees and Baghdad Street Fighting Afterall; Cheney may be US Baghdad Bob

VP Cheney's rose tint is undiminished - He's starting to look like Baghdad Bob, yes? Time Magazine's quote of the day:

"I look at it and see it is actually an affirmation that there are parts of Iraq where things are going pretty well." - VP Dick Cheney, responding to Tony Blair's decision to withdraw 1,600 British troops from Iraq
-----------------"Basra is dominated by 4 paramilitaries, who are fighting turf wars with one another and with the Iraqi government over oil smuggling rights." - Juan Cole

---

Mother Jones crunches the numbers and comes up with evidence that tensions and fitna imposed by the rejectionists in Iraq have created room for general rise in "jihadi" attacks (see chart below and story here - btw, read all of the rest of the feature, some of the statistics are astounding).

At this point in time, the world is not obviously safer (we've merely traded one kind of conflict for another), there are massive refugees (just not related to US bombing campaign to oust Saddam), and there will be street fighting in Baghdad by US Marines of significant intensity ...

They say things get worse before they get better, and while that is often the case, this project seems to be on long, long term horizon..

Keeping Faith: Not lost in Translation

There has to be some solution to the issue of special visas. Where there is a will there is a way, and there really ought to be a will:

(CBS) Iraqi interpreters have to keep their faces hidden to survive working so closely with U.S. troops. They are the eyes and ears of American soldiers, but as CBS News chief foreign correspondent Lara Logan reports, for that, they are hunted down and murdered.

There are close to 10,000 translators in Iraq alone — but until now, only 50 special visas to the U.S. have been available each year for both Iraq and Afghanistan.

For interpreters, like "Timmy," whose real name CBS News can't reveal, that lack of special visas is almost a death sentence.

...

"He's pulled soldiers out of trucks after the trucks have been hit with an IED. He's protected me while I was rendering first aid to a soldier," Krieger says.

Krieger says he has trusted him with his life multiple times.

Both men believe Timmy will die if he stays in Iraq. But he needs a U.S. general's signature to apply for that special visa. The problem is that he doesn't work with any generals.

Because It's Impossible to Move Forward Without Frank Assessment

Generals saying what President Bush apparently cannot (or Rumsfeld before him, "Give us all your sevens.").

I've pulled up some items that highlight the political problems, rather than the current fashion, which is to focus just on troop levels, surge or otherwise. I've tacked on a few military issues at the end, because there is no clear way forward without an honest and factual assessment.

Political Mistakes / Issues / Problems

On de-Ba'athification:

The very slow (if that) execution of the reconciliation component of de Ba'athification left tens of thousands [documented?] of former Ba'ath Party members (many of them Sunni Arabs, but also some Shi'a) feeling that they had no future opportunities in, or reason to support, the new Iraq. To be fair to CPA, AMB Bremer intended to execute reconciliation (Or exceptions to the de-Ba'athification order) and gave me permission, e.g. to do so on a trial basis in Ninevah Province; however, when we submitted the results of the reconciliation commission conducted for Mosul University and subsequent requests for exception generated by Iraqi processes with judicial oversight, no action was taken on them by the de-Ba'athification Committee in Baghdad [so what was done, instead?]. As realization set in among those affected that there was to be no reconciliation, we could feel support for the new Iraq ebbing in Sunni Arab majority areas [so was Rumsfeld right about dead-enders, but "flat wrong", to borrow one of his own phrases, about how to deal with them, then?]

On disbanding the Army:

Disbanding the Iraqi army (which was, to be sure, an army that Iraq did not need in the long term as it had vastly more senior officers than were remotely required and was more of a jobs program than a competent military force) without simultaneously announcing a stipend and pension program for those in the Army, the future plan for Iraq's defense forces, and provisions for joining those forces undoubtedly created tens of thousands of former soldiers and officers who were angry, feeling disrespected, and worried about how they would feed their families. (The stipend plan was eventually announced some 5 weeks after the disestablishment was announced, but it did not cover senior officers, who remained, therefore, influential critics of the new Iraq.) This action likely fueled, at least in part, the early growth of the insurgency and anti-coalition feeling.

Military Problems / Civilian Defense Department Issues
Sufficient Planning

We obviously had inadequate plans, concepts [!!!], organizations, resources [!!!], and policies for the conduct of Phase IV (stability and reconstruction) operations; consequently, we were slow to move into Phase IV operations.

There was an underestimation of the security challenges in Iraq, particularly in 2006 ...coupled with an overestimation of our ability to create new security institutions

There was the feeling that [national] elections would enhance the Iraqi sense of nationalism. Instead, the elections hardened sectarian positions as Iraqis voted largely based on ethnic and sectarian group identity.

Rapid Reaction / Adaptation

We took too long to recognize the growing insurgency and to take steps to counter it, though we did eventually come to grips with it.

We took too long to develop the concepts and structures needed to build effective Iraqi security forces to assist in providing security to the Iraqi people.

It repeatedly took us time to recognize changes in the security environment and to react to them. What began as an insurgency has morphed into a conflict that includes insurgent attacks, terrorism, sectarian violence, and violent crime. Our responses have had to continue to evolve in response, but that has not always been easy [that seems like code talk for the old saw, "The Right Way, the Wrong Way, and The Army's Way ...].

New General Offers His Own Top Priorities

In testimony worth reading in every detail, General Petreaus offers up his four focus areas, put here to contrast with Negroponte (below):

1. "The top challenge is providing the security necessary to reduce the cycle of violence in Iraq today.
   
   This will be a difficult mission and time is not on our side. We must focus on population security, particularly in Baghdad, to give the Iraqi government the breathing space it needs to become more effective.
   
   
2. The second challenge is continuing the development of capable Iraqi Security Forces, relatively free of ethnic and sectarian bias.
   
   The Iraqi Army has made much progress, but is uneven, and the police remain a challenge.
   
   
3. The third challenge is the integration of the interagency effort to ensure that progress is made along all lines of operation - not just security, but economic, governance, and the rule of law as well.
   
   
4. That is related to the fourth challenge, and that is the lack of capacity of the Iraqi government. Iraq has enormous natural resources and potential wealth. However to take advantage of its blessings, not only must security be improved, but critical national issues must be resolved by the Iraqis, on issues such as national reconciliation, the devolution of power below Baghdad, the distribution of oil wealth, and so on.
   
   Only through unity of effort of all - coalition and Iraqi, military and civilian - can we bring the full weight of our effot to bear on the difficult situaiton in Iraq.

The Intangible Benchmarks - How Progress will Really be Measured

Negroponte, on the eve of surprisingly leaving the DNI post (confirmed just in April of 2005), lays out some ideas on what National Intelligence is using for benchmarks of cricital progress in Iraq:

• Foremost is the ability of the Iraqi gov't to establish and nurture effective national institutions that are based on national rather than religious or ethnic interests; and within this context, the willingness of the security forces to pursue extremist elements of all kinds.
• The extent to which the Shia feel sufficiently secure in their political position: despite their recent electoral victories and overall political ascendancy, the Shia at present remain deeply insecure about their hold on power. This insecurity is manifested in the Shia's refusal to make real concessions to the Sunnis on a range of issues...
• The extent to which Arab Sunnis develop trust and participate in the new political order ...
• The extent to divisions within the Shia and Sunni are addressed: profound intra-group divisions among the Shia and Sunnis complicate the situation, because no single leader can speak for or exert control over these groups.
• The extent to which extremists - most notably al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) - are suppressed...
• And lastly, the extent to which Iraq's neighbors can be persuaded to stop the flow of militants and munitions across their borders.

link

Bush: Ahead or Behind the Curve?

Tonight the President rehearsed the now well worn dire warnings of "failure" in Iraq (a.k.a. "the quagmire"), but didn't add much to assist in an ongoing assessment of progress or retreat in the overall project.

The general tenor has moved from "Victory is certain" to "there is no magic bullet for Iraq".

Yet, there continue to be conflicts (necessary ones?), within the overall thinking. "America stands for freedom" and Iraq is "critical" in the "war on terror" (yes, they are still using that hapless phrase). However, such things are conditional in a somewhat unspecified way:

I [President Bush] have made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people ...
[and]
From Afghanistan to Lebanon to the Palestinian Territories, millions of ordinary people are sick of the violence, and want a future of peace and opportunity for their children. And they are looking at Iraq. They want to know: Will America withdraw and yield the future of that country to the extremists, or will we stand with the Iraqis who have made the choice for freedom?

I say 'necessary' because such contradictions seem to be part of trying to deliver steadfast message than can only help in a war-of-attrition and trying to manage the politics of shifting burdens.

NEW APPROACH DOESN'T INCLUDE WARTIME METRICS, AMERICAN PUBLIC STILL OUT OF THE 'CLASSIFIED WAR' LOOP

Among the critical things not supplied are any new metrics to give the average American a sense of how the "coalition" is doing, in any systematic way, although gone are the blanket trust-me statements that plagued past public assessments (unless one is rigorous enough similarly to fault the blanket assessment, "the situation in Iraq is not acceptable").

We are told we are at a critical juncture. It seems to me that almost all military campaigns are constantly at a critical juncture, so one must take this statement as a patch, a way to warm over a change by 'seeing' future tactical opportunity rather than prior tactical misstep.

If this critical juncture is brought about by a realization that we don't have enough troops to "hold" areas that have been cleared, that insight has been on the table in a very high profile way for months now. It suggests incompetence to only be realizing that the 'whack-a-mole' approach is a loser in terms of fighting insurgency.

Besides, if the security strategy is still clear-hold-build, then calling it all a "new strategy" is slight of hand.

A STRATEGY FOR SECTARIAN VIOLENCE?

I noted a while back that the emergence of induced sectarian strife probably violated some of the given assumptions in the old "Strategy for Victory in Iraq".
There seems to be no good idea about how to stem the cycle of violence, apart from more troops while getting the Iraqi government to actually try a rule-of-law approach, rather than a eye-for-eye approach.

This background briefing suggests that there is an Iraqi-inspired plan to handle the sectarian violence around the capital. It does NOT offer a strategic outline of what the plan amounts to, therefore obviates later assessment, nor does it suggest why prior efforts didn't meet their objectives, precisely. The hope is that better organization and more resources will do what could not be done before:

The good news is that the Iraqi government has -- they have come forward with a plan. This was first given to the President when he was in Amman, Jordan, and met with Prime Minister Maliki's security people, the government security people, and our commanders have been working on that plan. The good news is that they believe that the plan fixes the problems that plagued our earlier efforts to bring security to Baghdad and is a plan that will work. And he'll describe it in some detail. - Senior White House Official

The details, from President Bush:

Our past efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: There were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have. Our military commanders reviewed the new Iraqi plan to ensure that it addressed these mistakes. They report that it does. They also report that this plan can work.

Now let me explain the main elements of this effort: The Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital. The Iraqi government will deploy Iraqi Army and National Police brigades across Baghdad's nine districts. When these forces are fully deployed, there will be 18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades committed to this effort, along with local police. These Iraqi forces will operate from local police stations -- conducting patrols and setting up checkpoints, and going door-to-door to gain the trust of Baghdad residents.

What we don't have good information on is what is driving the sectarian violence, with some suggesting that it is reprisal and some suggesting that it is Shia trying to consolidate power inside Baghdad.

NO CONCEPTUAL TIMEFRAME, NO COST

In terms of any broad understanding of how long or how far the insurgency might yet wear on (some average estimates of similar conflicts run to nine years), nothing is given. "Sacrifice" is called for, but no cost and no CURRENT cost is mentioned, other than the lives of the brave soldiers who follow orders.

NO DIPLOMACY, PLEASE, MR. BAKER

There will be no grand diplomatic initiative as recommended by the Baker report. Iran and Syria are complicit in destabilization, an assessment, so far, offered time and again, recklessly, without any Karine-A like evidence.

This go-it-alone mentality continues to suggest that the militarists, despite Rumsfeld's departure are still in control of the government or that President Bush has yet to learn how to do diplomacy - true diplomacy - after all these years. "America must win" is still the operating belief - there is no sharing of risks and no sharing of glory, no prepping for passing the political baton to others who also have a stake in stability.

What Secretary Rice's announced visit to the mideast will specifically attempt to achieve is unknown. However, W. Patrick Lang offers up a clear perspective on how failure to adequately prep a regional engagement leaves the US without one, good political exit strategy.

PERSONNEL CHANGES

Notes that Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Generals Casey and Abizaid are slated to leave stand in stark contrast to evidence from Vietnam that short tours of "advisers" greatly contributed to an inability to be effective on the ground. Perhaps it is time for them to move onward, but shifting of personnel in a complex, long, and phased campaign weakens the effort, rather then re-enforcing it.

The notion of doubling the number of transition teams is great. Perhaps that will help to create information flow that will keep corruption and incompetence in a new Iraqi central government from getting as far out of hand as it seems to have done in Afghanistan. All the same, what is paramount is coordination between the political efforts (reconstruction) and military efforts, and no assurances were given that organizational changes that improve integration of effort are on the way.

However, the problem that this type of effort (counter-insurgency) might need to be planned in chunks of time of 2-3 years seems to escape the people for all parts of the political spectrum.

WALK THE LINE?

These are the few commitments we get for the upcoming year:

To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws, and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's constitution.

Elections "later this year". Reform of Baathification has been on the table for how long now? At least since last fall. Amend the constitution ... for pity's sake, the country barely has a functioning central government and the chief worry is how to amend the constitution?

Bush appears to make 'show' out of Rumsfeld's firing, buys time...

That's the only thing that one can conclude, so far, from the series of events, from November to December's end, 2006. Why would you fire a SecDef in the middle of conflict, unless you had a sense that there was something better at hand?

FOREVER YOUNG

The whole "New Policy" meme is starting to look ridiculous. Abjectly so.

The Iraq Study Group was convened nine months ago, now. Hitler's entire campaign into Soviet Russia had its decisiveness judged in a matter of three or four months, practically speaking, if my memory of military history serves. How can it be that the CIC is still "studying" the problem? I'm all for time-outs for re-evaluation, but the NIE estimate from last April was that things would be getting worse - who had the contingency plan?

"STAY THE COURSE", STILL OPERATIVE

One cannot help but feel that stay-the-course is still operative, because Bush is either waiting for al-Malaki to prove himself as the right guy for Iraq on some unknown measure(s) or for facts on the ground to shift in his favor, somehow. Last, he may be waiting for the new Congress in order to stick-it-to-ém with some controversial proposal - who knows, it's hard to believe anything he says, any longer (for me).

'GENERIC NEED' FOR MORE TROOPS - WHAT THE HECK IS THAT!?

Last, but hardly least, the one bit that we are given, without any broader strategy revealed for aligning the government institutions in a grand way to combat and win the fight against extremism, is that the Marines need a larger permanent force-structure.

For more invasions?

I mean seriously, shouldn't one try to win the "war" that is in front of them, before worrying about the "harder choices" of the next generations? Good grief!

BACKGROUND:

President Bush's 'Stay the Course on Policy Change'
Nov 8th, Fires Rumsfeld
Nov 11th, Meets with Israeli PM Olmert
Nov 30th - Meets with Malaki
Dec 6th - Iraq Study group
Dec 11th - Meets with State Department Officials
Dec 12th - Meets with Iraqi VP Hashemi
Dec 13th - Meets with Pentagon Brass
- Quips, "I won't be rushed"
Dec 18th - Swears in Gates

Dec 20th - Announces that large Army is required

"Let me wait and gather all the recommendations from Bob Gates, from our military, from diplomats on the ground; I'm interested in the Iraqis' point of view; and then I'll report back to you as to whether or not I support a surge or not. Nice try."

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I haven't made up my mind yet about more troops. I'm [STILL?] listening to our commanders; I'm listening to the Joint Chiefs, of course; I'm listening to people in and out of government; I'm listening to the folks on the Baker-Hamilton commission about coming up with a strategy that helps us achieve our objective."

More Troops - generically, I mean:

Q Good morning, Mr. President. Your former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, advocated for a lighter, more agile military force. Have you now concluded that that approach was wrong?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I strongly support a lighter, agile army that can move quickly to meet the threats of the 21st century. I also supported his force posture review and recommendations to move forces out of previous bases that were there for the Soviet threat, for example, in Europe. So he's introduced some substantive changes to the Pentagon, and I support them strongly.

However, that doesn't necessarily preclude increasing end strength for the army and the Marines. And the reason why I'm inclined to believe this is a good idea is because I understand that we're going to be in a long struggle against radicals and extremists, and we must make sure that our military has the capability to stay in the fight for a long period of time. I'm not predicting any particular theater, but I am predicting that it's going to take a while for the ideology of liberty to finally triumph over the ideology of hate

Indian Treaty Room, Press Conference

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UPDATE:
Dec 28th - Meets with National Security Staff
Jan 10th - Notifies Congressional Leaders, Meets with Press, National TV Speech, Falcon Brigade from 82nd Airborne arrives Baghdad following week

Iran, early response to new diplomatic initiative ...

Long and excellent summary of US-Iran relations post-OIF,
Engaging Iran on Iraq: At What Price and to What End?
By Patrick Clawson December 5, 2006

The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have a long history of direct bilateral talks. For example, during the Taliban days, the two sides met often about Afghanistan, though always with at least one outside representative present to maintain the official cover that the talks were not bilateral. Iranian and American officials also met before and during the United States’ entry into Iraq, convening at least three times in 2003—in January, March, and May—to discuss the Iraq situation. While a UN official opened each meeting to preserve the fiction that they were not bilateral sessions, the official soon left the two delegations on their own.

Direct U.S.-Iranian talks ceased in 2003.

On October 19, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced, “We have considered whether contacts that are specifically related to Iraq might be useful between Ambassador [to Iraq Zalmay] Khalilzad and his counterpart on the same basis that we had them, essentially, in Afghanistan.” Administration officials later clarified that such talks were in fact authorized. Khalilzad is a native Persian speaker who conducted pre-invasion talks with Iran about Afghanistan. On October 20 [notice how prompt their public diplomacy 're-action' is ...], 2005, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi stated that Iran saw no reason to talk to the United States until it “revises its behavior and attitude,” a view repeatedly echoed by other Iranian officials in the following months.

On March 16, 2006, five months after Rice made the offer for talks, Iranian National Security Council secretary Ali Larijani accepted the offer, saying, “We agree to talk to the Americans,” while emphasizing that Iran was acting because of a request by Abdalaziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). However, that position was reversed by President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad, who stated on April 24, “By God’s will, we think that right now, because of the presence of a permanent government in Iraq, there is no need” for talks with the United States.
[continue reading, high reccomended summary of Iranian views accross the political spectrum]

In the LA Times (before ISG-Report):

An official Iranian source, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Iran's position was unchanged and continued to urge a quick U.S. withdrawal.

"We oppose the Western forces continuing the occupation there. As long as they are there, we think the violence in this situation will continue, and it does not help whatsoever the stability in the region," he said.

Another official source echoed that view. "Why would the U.S. think that their rapid withdrawal would be rejected by Iran? Do they think their presence is a help? Iran thinks it is not," he said.

From the redoubtable BBC, although it is hard to judge the basis or veractiy of these items:

Iran wants a wholesale transformation of its relationship with the United States, which is one of the most antagonistic in the world. [by their choice? for their purpose?]

At the moment attention of the US and its allies is on Iran's nuclear programme which they say is intended to produce a non-conventional military capability.

Iran wants to be allowed to continue its programme - including uranium enrichment - which it says is completely peaceful [but ignores the IAEA's requests that might shed light on that assertion?] as well as its right under the international non-proliferation regime.

That means an end to the threat of UN sanctions - which Tehran has been able to avoid so far - and an end to US and Israeli threats of military action to destroy its nuclear facilities.

In the past, Tehran has had its fingers burnt [?] by trying to open a dialogue with this most hawkish of US administrations.

In May 2003, for example, it offered to open up its nuclear programme, rein in Hezbollah and co-operate against al-Qaeda, but was reportedly rebuffed as the insistence of former Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-President Dick Cheney. [is that all true?]

A VERY SMART VIEW ABOUT WHAT TO DO DIPLOMATICALLY

“In my personal opinion, the Arab League needs to talk to Iran,” says El Reedy, who is a member of CFR’s international advisory committee and chairman of the Egyptian Council on Foreign Relations. El Reedy says “Iran is already a power, a force, a factor, in the Middle East and the Arab nations.” He said if high-level talks are held between Iran and leading Arab states, “then we could maybe find some intermediary and the feelings could cool off” in Lebanon.

Rummy Accepts Medal, Schedules Town Meeting, Farewell Set for 15th

Sec Def Donald Rumsfeld accepted the Union League's Gold Medal a week ago or so. According to Defenselink, Gates will assume responsibility on the 18th and Rummy's farewell party is the 15th.

One last chance to soak up Rummyspeak:

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(AP Photo/Haraz N. Ghanbari)

In a surprise move, Sec Def Rumsfeld takes a ... quasi-victory lap, visiting troops in Iraq on Dec. 9th ...

The Second "Thumpin'" - Comments on ISG Report

Presidential Historian, Michael Beschloss, in Newsweek:

History suggests that Baker-Hamilton’s ultimate contribution may be whatever outside pressure it generates on President Bush and Congress to achieve a bipartisan solution in Iraq.

The times in history when such panels have had the greatest impact have been when they provided a president with the mechanics and bipartisan blessing to do what he probably wanted to do anyway. The best two examples are both from the Reagan years. In 1981, President Reagan appointed an expert commission led by Alan Greenspan (not yet Fed chairman) to suggest how to fix that generation’s Social Security problems.

Six years later, besieged by the Iran-contra scandal, Reagan appointed a bipartisan group headed by Texas Republican Sen. John Tower to suggest how to revise White House management to exclude the future possibility of unauthorized covert operations. By promptly accepting the Tower Commission’s wise recommendations and admitting his mistakes, Reagan helped to save his presidency.

One reason the Tower findings were so briskly accepted was the expertise of the commission’s staff director, who knew how important it was for the president to take its report seriously. This was a young lawyer named Stephen Hadley, who has gone on to become President Bush’s national-security adviser.

George F. Will, in WaPo:

The Iraq Study Group, like the policy it was created to critique, was overtaken by the unexpectedly rapid crumbling of the U.S. position in Iraq since the ISG was formed in March.
...
Also in the week before the ISG's report, the leaked Donald Rumsfeld memo urged policy to "go minimalist." That is generally good advice to government, but much of the rest of the memo, with its 21 "illustrative new courses of action" -- a large number, and evidence that none is especially promising -- echoed the 1960s Great Society confidence in government-engineered behavior modification...

The ISG's central conclusion, important to say with the group's imprimatur even though the conclusion is obvious, is that the problem with Iraq is the Iraqis, a semi-nation of peoples who are very difficult to help.

Syria weighs in, again, on Iraq

Vice President weighs in here, with Syrian perspective and demands that include a fixed timetable under the 'excuse' of fighting 'occupiers'.

In reference to a Syrian worry about a widening conflagration coming out of a deteriorating Iraq, he either directly calls the Baker-Hamilton bluff or opens public negotiations by mitigating it:

As for the notion of an international conference on Iraq, many European countries have recommended it to us. We support the formula but only if we know what the intended outcome of such a conference is. It has to have reasonable objectives that we can agree to work for.

We will not support just any political process in Iraq, we will support it only when it takes into account the interests of all the different groups in Iraq, when the Unity of the country is preserved, and when there is a time table for withdrawal (of US troops)

The US has failed terribly in Iraq. The Baker-Hamilton Report is an indication that the American people are waking up to the fact that they have been badly deceived by their government in Iraq. Some say that through dialogue with Syria and Iran, Iraq can be stabilized. We are not so arrogant as to believe that Syria can single-handedly solve the Iraq problem, which will have repercussions throughout the world. Perhaps not even all countries working together can help solve Iraq's problem, but it is incumbent on us to have the modesty to listen to each other and to try what we can.

We will not help any Iraqi leader who isn't against the occupation of Iraq or trying to end it. We told this to Allawi, to Jafari and to Maliki. We are against foreign occupation.

We do not expect much change in the American position. Some minor change, or a cosmetic change, or a tactical change. Although the public opinion in the United States is against the war, there are powerful groups in the US saying: "we will not leave empty handed after the 450 Billions we spent in Iraq." [translation thanks to Joshua Landis & friends

And on the re-emergence of Sharaa, this nugget in the early evolution of Syrian thinking on Iraq:

Sharaa also argued for the hard Syrian line on Iraq (Jihad) and resistance) in contrast to Khaddam. He probably believing that Saddam would put up more resistance than he did in opposing the American invasion. When this didn't happen and the US went on its Syria offensive, accusing Syria of aiding Iraq's Baathist deadeners, taking in Saddam's WMD, and opening a Ho Chi Min trail, Khaddam was given the Iraq portfolio. Khaddam tried to organize the Sunni tribal leaders in order to deliver them to the Americans and reopen a dialogue with Washington on the basis of delivering Iraqi Sunni cooperation for Lebanon. This strategy failed because Washington would not talk to its enemies, use diplomacy with the Syrians, or pay blackmail (whichever description you prefer). [Landis]

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UPDATE: December 10th
al-jazeerah poll:

Will Hezbollah protests bring down the Lebanese government?

Yes : 44.2 % ; No : 38.7 % ; I don't know : 17.1 %

Number of pollers:12779

Newt, Pre-empting the Iraqi Study Group

link - Newt takes up the Iraqi Study Group

1. Does the Commission Have a Vision for Success in the Larger War Against the Dictatorships and Fanatics Who Want to Destroy Us?

I think that few are left who do not realize that there is a larger struggle for legitimacy, or as Tony Blair has put it, "Whose values will lead into the 21st Century", but not many agree on what the implications of that are for tactics, duration, resourcing, involvement.

I would bet dollars that the Study Group will have recommendations on how to confront radical ideologies within Islam. However, they may end up too vague, like "adopt a comprehensive approach" or "adopt long-term strategies".

2. Does the Commission Recognize That the Second Campaign in Iraq Has Been a Failure?

Their staff may not be able to agree why it has been a defeat, even more so without a classified clearance, so it may not be productive to declare a defeat.

3. Does the Commission Recognize the Scale of Change We Will Need to Adopt to Be Effective in a World of Enemies Willing to Kill Themselves in Order to Kill Us? Learning to win requires much more than changes in the military. It requires changes in how our intelligence, diplomatic, information and economic institutions work.

It seems unlikely that there will not be a battery of bureaucratic recommendations and changes to institutionalization, many including taking the military out of the 'lead', if Newt is ready for that ...

4. Does the Commission Describe the Consequences of Defeat in Iraq?
What would the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Iraq look like?

The larger military question is whether so much matters. In a purest sense, there are no such thing as 'unacceptable consequences' - war is Hell. When you go to "war", you accept even the unintended consequences, the Pandora's box that it opens, yes?

All quagmires are political, not military. As such, the Iraqi campaign is on borrowed time, by many metrics.

5. Does the Commission Understand the Importance of Victory? Winning is key. Time is on the side of those seeking nuclear and biological weapons to use against the civilized world.

Yet, time is exactly what is required for the scale of transformation that is necessitated.

"Victory" is misstatement or a poor choice of words. The near-term goals are containment, the mid-term goals are pressure, and the long-term goals are attenuation. The more one thinks in terms of a decisive "victory" the LESS likely it becomes.

6. Does the Commission Define What It Means to Win, or Simply Find a Face-Saving Way to Lose? Winning is very definable. Can we protect our friends and hurt our enemies?

It seems contradictory to suggest that the second campaign was a defeat but to suggest that a third is possible to "win".

It would not be reasonable to calibrate goals beyond what the facts on the ground make possible.

What's more, it seems to me more robust to come up with a perspective in which all outcomes are covered by a set of goal statements, recognizing that a significant portion of the outcome is not in the control of the U.S., either in the hands of an Iraqi government or others.

7. Does the Commission Acknowledge That Winning Requires Thinking Regionally and Even Globally?

humm...

Well, Saudi Arabia is spending millions on a medium-term (3+year) project to seal its border electronically with Iraq.

Newt sounds like he is looking for military escalation here, with "direct confrontation" of Syria and Iran. Of course, if he means "Karine-A" type evidence, then he ought to say so. That kind of evidence could be used quite successfully in non-military ways.

8. Any Proposal to Ask Iran and Syria to Help Is a Sign of Defeat. Does the Commission Suggest This? Iran and Syria are the wolves in the region.

Any proposal? Even "enemies" can cooperate to prevent the plug from being pulled on them both ...

9. Does the Commission Believe We Can 'Do a Deal' With Iran? The clear effort by the Iranians to acquire nuclear weapons and Ahmadinejad's assertion that it is easy to imagine a time in the near future when the United States and Israel have both disappeared should be adequate proof that the Iranian dictatorship is the active enemy of America. Couple that with the fact that the Iranians lied to the International Atomic Energy Agency for 18 years while trying to develop a nuclear weapon. Either this is a dangerous regime we need to fundamentally change, or it is a reasonable regime with which we can deal.

Too much either/or thinking, here. Besides, what nation lives 'without enemies' in modern times?

Nuclear proliferation has to be put on a separate plate than other issues, and cannot be, as Newt suggests, a matter of 'friends and enemies', at least among nation-states.

The rest of the issues with Iran are more nettlesome and what are the options to doing deals or making agreements, really?


10. Does the Commission Believe We Are More Clever Than Our Enemies?
The al-Assad family has run Syria since 1971.

Well, Syria is needed for a settlement of the I/P issue, one way or the other ...

11. Does the Commission Recognize the Importance of Working With the Democratic Majorities on a Strategy for Victory? The Democratic victory in the 2006 election should not be used as an excuse to do the wrong thing. The Democrats are now confronting the responsibility and burden of power. Opposition to continuing the failed second campaign should not be translated into opposition to an American victory.

The burden of power? The burden of prior mistakes ...

The issue of a third-campaign is whether it meets its burden of proof, empirically, not ideologically. And that's how it ought to be.

Is the Government Following its Own 'Strategy for Victory in Iraq'?

ABIZAID TESTIFIES BEFORE CONGRESS

General John P. Abizaid, the man with more stress in world than Atlas in the Old World, offered up a careful assessment of the current situation in Iraq.

Is there evidence that the Government is following its own announced Strategy for Victory? How do we get over the hump of whether more is needed before less is accepted, if we can? There are so many issues/questions to look at, I'll just confine to these two.

IS THERE A SHARP EYE ON THE CHOSEN STRATEGY AND TOOLS?

It is easy to lob criticisms from every direction imaginable at people who are trying to run with the ball, as much as we have relegated the military to do so, for this conflict, with a sort-of closed-door vision of what to do and how to do it.

Yet, we still have the basic document that is meant to be informing the public about what are the steps to getting to goal, the administrations National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.

That document calls for short-term, medium-term, and longer-term goals. We don't see any of the present status reporting broken out into those categories, even if people are thinking of it. We appear to continue, even at this late date, to be asking questions about what the administration lists as a 'short-term' goal, namely the standing up of Iraqi Security Forces.

I may have surely missed them, but I didn't see much discussion about whether long-term goals were being met in places that had more stability, like the North and the South.

THE NINA, THE PINTA, AND THE SANTA MARIA

To reach the proverbial New World, the National Strategy document breaks down three conceptual areas, with the following strategies:

Political Track: Isolate, Engage, and Build
Security Track: Clear, Hold, Build
Economic Track: Restore, Reform, Build

Elsewhere the document invokes 'expanding political participation'. In the details, one finds the assumptions on which this strategy is conditioned.

Ambassador Satterfield injects a new "three pillars" element, but this is not new to the overall position, just, perhaps, a new area of rhetorical emphasis.

NO 'STRATEGY' FOR SECTARIAN VIOLENCE?

The rise in sectarian violence isn't covered by the National Strategy document.

What appears to have happened is that the an urgent emphasis on 'reconciliation' in the Political Track, which has involved a re-work of the Bremer-era de-Ba'thification, has been legislated in conjunction with a new military emphasis on Baghdad in the Security Track, supplied by soldiers from some other effort.

The Ambassador notes the simulataneity of the equations for each track; however, he suggests that only from the safety of a secure situation can the right compromises be reached. Elsewhere, the General suggests that only faced with the need to provide for their own security will the Iraqis themselves stand-up, so that the US soldiers can stand down. Apparently, these two seemingly opposed positions are resolvable.

THE ECONOMIC TRACK

THE POLITICAL TRACK - MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AMID 'CHAOS'

THE TROOP DEBATE

[to be continued after the show]

Straight talk on "Strategy" Generates Administration Accountability

"Accountability" is in the air in Washington, at least in prospect.

A TEMPLATE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND CITIZEN-LED EVALUATION

One way forward is to start insisting in clear thinking. Not just smart-talk about counterterrorism, but also demand that the Administration (especially Scty Rumsfeld and the DoD Press Corps) clearly separate goals from strategy, and that they be fully accountable for the strategy -- for clearly articulating it, responsibly communicating it, and for sharing evaluations of it.

Some tactical choices may prove insufficient to an adopted strategy. This doesn't negate the strategy, per se. However, if there are no or few tactics that can be or have been used to execute the strategy, then the strategy may not be executable or adoptable. Something else is needed.

STRATEGIC EVALUATION

If the results of a strategy turn out to be insufficiently complete or show themselves too costly (measured in time or treasure or both), and if there are indications that other factors that make the effectiveness of a strategy remote or increasingly remote, then the achiveability of the stated goals starts to come into question.

SAMPLES

These are examples of goals (and they can be disputed):

• Neutralize the insurgency (Woodward quotes Rumsfeld)
• An Iraq that can defend and sustain itself and be an ally in the "War on terror" (not my phrase). (Bush in Stephanopolous interview)

These are slogans, mostly useless (boo! ug!):

• Stay the course
• Cut and Run
• Until the job is finished
• Peace with Dignity
• The Only Exit Strategy is Victory

Here is one counter-insurgency strategy: CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD ( clear /limit each area of those with hostile intent and capability; hold ground against backsliding; and build out political, security, and infrastructure until overall objective is achieved).

Within the strategy there could be various tactics:

• Perimiter operations, US only troops
• Police training, Army involvement (US, Iraqi, other national)
• Psy-ops
• Political negotiations/bargaining - even payoffs for information and cooperation
• Support from Scorpion Brigades

Trust Me, the Iraqi ‘War’ is Going as Well as Expected

SAY WHAAAAT?

`We are making progress everyday in Iraq', is what we heard this week and last from the WH press secretary and from the DOD podium.

Do you feel like you have enough information to know whether OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) is going well or not? I don't.

I'm talking about decision-quality information.

By that, I mean sufficiently comprehensive, systematic, accurate information, not just ad-hoc reporting of this particular area of sectarian violence, this-or-that town, or the latest backward-looking body count?

YOU HAVE TO KNOW WHAT YOU WANT TO GET IT

It is time to start challenging the notion that the remainder of this struggle in Iraq needs to be classified "secret" in order to win it. I've put together a potential starting point at the end of this post for what I have in mind. Everyone should consider what is on their own list, however. This is not dogma!

---

Here is what I want from my government, for the sake of my Army and for the sake of a government by The People, not by The Experts. I hope you do was well.

REQUIRED WAR REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, bi-weekly

OIF Strategy: CLEAR - HOLD - BUILD

PROGRESS REPORTING, Percent completed

• Five metrics of progress for each segment of "Clear", "Hold" and "Build".
• An overall % completed guesstimate
• Breakdown for each Province, 18 in all. Breakdown by other, smaller groups (by sheik, by jurisdiction, by sharia court if one has been set up for a local area, by any group with significant influence in an area).
• Requested field resourcing.
• Breakdown of the assessment of what materials, equipment, and political support are needed at each stage, for example:
  
  CLEAR - troop levels and skills unique to `Clear', weaponry, intelligence, time-phased troop levels and skills, required Iraqi expertise (troop levels, cooperation/coordination, equipment, etc.); Foreign cooperation and expertise;
  
  HOLD - troop levels and skills and levels unique to `Hold', buildup of army forces, alliances, political certainty on issues, Iraqi expertise (build-out of army and police units, vertical and horizontal political consolidation of power/influence, short-term economic improvements); Foreign support (material and nonmaterial);
  
  BUILD - troop levels and skills, maintenance of political alliances/cooperation, electricity, water, all things USAID; U.N.

ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN THE MILITARY

1. A disclosure on the what personnel design strategy has been chosen to ensure that cross-functional teams that are meant to solve the problems that are known to exits at each stage of clear-hold-build. Some of these tasks require long-term commitments; others, short-term.
   
   This may imply different incentives, longer tours and commitments for advisers, different training needs - the list is very, very long.
   
   
2. We ought to significantly challenge the notion that all coordinated effort (and information) be limited to the military chain of command, Period.
   
   This may involve a redefinition of the unit level to include civilians of one type or another, including State Department or USAID people or others who need to be part of competent, cross-functional teams.
   
   
3. Metrics on the processing of requests and a top-Brass accountability `track' that ensures that important field-requests and information are not slipping through the cracks of the bureaucracy.
   
   This may mean that the military has to get more publicly `exposed' than they are used to in peacetime. If we need to elect one of their own in 2008 to get them to do, so be it.

REFOCUS THE OLD DEBATES IN A NEW LIGHT

We ought to be able to end or attenuate the exhausting debate about `troop levels' in this way.

Field-level raw requests for troops will give a bottom-up range, low to high, of the requested troop levels. How the Brass chooses to `modify 'those requests and the rational can also be laid bare. At least this decision process will finally be made plain enough that we can stop saying "trust me" and start arguing tactics, which may not result in agreement, but at least it will end radical doubt and maybe even create some buy-in.

INFORMED CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED

Without a fact-based sense of retreat or advance, a policy of `hope' cannot be sustained, even if aptly put. No amount of repeating the threats, the so-called lessons of 9-11, or harping on "the stakes" (that were not initially laid plain or made clear), is going to be ultimately sufficient.

During World War II, people knew of grave dangers, they knew when the Germans were advancing and when there was a battlefield retreat or difficulty. They had Roosevelt and Churchill to offer words to help keep the faith.

Today, instead, we have an amorphous war with threats of failure keeping us going rather than a calm, technical approach to counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency on which we can publically debate.

It is time to demand better for the Republic, don't you think?